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1The status of this "cross-appeal" has been the subject of 
confusion. As appellant makes clear in its jurisdictional 
statement, it does not think it should be here. It had appealed 
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1. SUMMARY: Section 1113 of the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act of 1983 requires any applicant for financial 
aid under the Higher Education Act of 1965 who is eligible for 
the draft to file a statement indicating that he has registered 
for the draft in accordance with all applicable regulations. The 
DC declared §1113 unconstitutional as a Bill of Attainder and as 
a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The United States appealed 
directly to this Court under 28 u.s.c. §1252. There also is a 
cross appeal from the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 
which was dismissed for lack of standing by the DC • 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The Minnesota Public In-
terest Research Group (MPIRG) brought suit in D.Minn. challenging 
the constitutionality of the Department of Defense Authorization 
• Act of 1983. Section 1113 of the Act provides that any person 
who is required under section 3 of the Military Selective Service 
Act to present himself for and submit to registration for the 
draft and fails to do so in accordance with any rule or regula-
tion issued under section 3 shall be ineligible for federal high-
• 
to the CA8 from the DC's dismissal of its claim for lack of 
standing. After the government appealed in No. 83-276, the 
government moved in the CA8 to dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. The CA8 transferred the appeal here, under 28 
u.s.c. §1252. The Clerk's office informed appellant that it had 
to file its jurisdictional statement in the time normally 
allotted for a cross-appeal, even though its appeal was more like 
an "adjacent appeal". Thus, the jurisdictional statement was due 
on September 21, 1983, thirty days after the government's 
jurisdictional statement in No. 83-276. If the notice of 
transfer from the CA8 had been treated like a separate appeal, 
appellant would have had sixty days in which to file its 
jurisdictional statement. The technical status of the appeal was 
not resolved, but Justice Blackmun granted appellant a 12 day 
extension, until October 3, 1983, in which to file the statement. 
.. 
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er education assistance under title IV of the Higher Education 
Act of 1965. It also provides that in order to receive any 
grant, loan, etc under the Higher Education Act, a person who is 
required to register for the draft shall file with the institu-
tion of higher education he plans to attend a statement of com-
pliance with section 3 and regulations issued thereunder. 
The DC dismissed MPIRG for lack of standing. MPIRG appealed 
to the CA8. The DC allowed three anonymous students to intervene 
as plaintiffs. Two days later three other anonymous students 
filed a separate action making the same claims as those made in 
the first action. The DC informally consolidated the claims. 
On March 9, 1983, the DC preliminarily enjoined appellants 
from enforcing §1113, but allowed them to promulgate regulations 
pending final disposition of the suits. The DC found a suffi-
cient threat of irreparable injury in the inevitability that 
appellees would be denied financial assistance. It found a like-
lihood of success on the merits on appellees' claim that §1113 
violated the Bill of Attainder Clause and the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination. 
The DC's reasoning on the Bill of Attainder issue was that 
§1113 singles out an ascertainable group based on past conduct 
and legislatively determines its guilt by assuming that all stu-
dents who fail to submit the required statement possess a guilty 
intent to avoid registration requirements. It inflicts punish-
ment by depriving students of the means to attend institutions of 
higher education. Appellees thus satisfied the three factor test 
set out in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 
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425, 468 (1977). 
The DC rejected appellants' argument that §1113 was not ad-
dressed to past conduct but only to present and future actions, 
since those who had not registered could become eligible by reg-
istering now. The DC noted that the s.ct. had rejected the same 
argument over 100 years ago in Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 277 (1867), where the Court struck down a bill that pre- 5'~'1 
~f 
vented Confederate officers from holding office. The defendant -:::::----------------- ------
had argued that the plaintiff could avoid the act's restrictions 
by making a loyalty oath. The Court said: "This deprivation is 
punishment; nor is it any less so because a way is opened from it 
by the expurgatory oath." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 327. The DC also 
noted that Presidential Proclamation No. 4771 requires that eli-
gible persons register within 30 days of their 18th birthday. 
On the self-incrimination issue, the DC found that informa-
tion obtained from the statement of compliance could furnish a 
1 ink in the chain of evidence used to prosecute the nonreg is-
tr ant. 
After issuance of the preliminary injunction, parties in 
both cases filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On June 16, 
1983, the court issued a permanent injunction that was nationwide 
in scope. On June 29, 1983, this Court stayed the DC's June 16 
order pending the disposition of this appeal. The government has 
appealed directly to this Court under 28 u.s.c. §1252, which 
provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Curt from an 
interlocutory or final judgment of any court of the United States 
holding an Act of Congress unconsitutional in any civil action to 
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which the United States is a party. 
On July 18, 1983, the government filed a motion to dismiss 
the appeal by MPIRG in the CAB. MPIRG had filed a brief in that 
court, but no other action had been taken. The basis for the 
motion was the second paragraph of 28 u.s.c. §1252., which pro-
vides that: 
"A party who has received notice of appeal under this 
section shall take any subsequent appeal or cross ap-
peal to the Supreme Court. All appeals or cross ap-
peals taken to other courts prior to such notice shall 
be treated as taken directly to the Supreme Court." 
The CAB (Heaney, Ross, Arnold) (order) transferred the appeal 
to this Court on August 17, 1983. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
A. No. 276 
The government contends that the DC misconstrued §1113. 
Section 1113 permits the award of Title IV aid to students who 
cure their past failure to register by doing so at the time they 
seek assistance. The section therefore is not a Bill of Attain---- - -
der because it does not punish past conduct. Al though it is 
--, 
possible to read §1113 as the DC did, as requiring registration 
within the time fixed by Proclamation No. 4771, it is also possi-
ble to read the "in accordance with" language in §1113 as requir-
ing registration in the manner required by any proclamation or 
regulation. The government contends that its interpretation is 
consistent with the legislative intent to encourage registration 
by those who have not done so. 
In the government's view, the self-incrimination claim 
is frivolous. Students are not required to request federal fi-
~ 
• 
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nancial aid. They are not forced to choose between self-
incrimination and loss of Title IV aid. They simply have no 
r i9ht to federal f i~ ial aid if they have not registered for 
the draft. 
Finally, the government challenges the nationwide scope 
of the DC's injunction, when there was no class certified. 
Appellees have filed a motion to affirm. They insist 
that the DC was right on the Bill of Attainder and self-
incrimination issues. They also urge that §1113 denies students 
in need of financial aid equal protection, and that it discrimi-
nates on the basis of wealth, sex and age. They also insist that 
in view of the DC' s finding that § 1113 was unconstitutional, 
nationwide relief was appropriate. 
Amicus briefs have been filed by the University of Min-
nesota, et al., and by Swarthmore College, in support of the 
motion to affirm. Both amici emphasize the discrimination issues 
raised below but not reached by the DC. 
B. No. 83-637 
At the direct ion of the c 1 erk ' s officer , MP I RG has 
filed a jurisdictional statement. MPIRG strenuously objects to 
the CA8's transfer of its appeal to this Court. It insists that 
28 u.s.c. §1252 does not cover its appeal of the DC's dismissal 
of its claim for lack of standing. After that appeal, it no 
longer was a party to the DC proceedings. It urges that the 
Court remand its case to the CA8. Alternatively, if the Court 
finds that a remand is not appropriate, MPIRG urges that the 
Court note jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. §1252. Otherwise, it 
? 
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will have been denied its right to appeal under 28 u.s.c. §1252. 
On the merits, MPIRG urges that the DC erred in finding 
that it did not have standing to challenge §1113. MPIRG meets 
the three prong test set out in Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977): 
"an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of 
its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests 
it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's 
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the 
relief requested requires the participation of individ-
ual members in the lawsuit." 
The DC interpreted Hunt as requiring individual representa-
tion where there is a "diversity of view" among the members of 
the organization. The DC reasoned that some of the members of 
MPIRG would have registered and others would not have to regis-
ter. Thus, the organization could not represent only the view-
point of those who had not registered. MPIRG insists that the 
fact that some members would not be personally affected by the 
statute does not mean that they did not all share an ideological 
opposition to it. 
The DC also questioned whether the suit was germane to 
the organization's purposes. MPIRG insists that it is. MPIRG's 
stated goals are to promote public interest and social welfare, 
to maximize financial aid available to needy students and to 
protect students' constitutional rights. If the DC had insuffi-
cient information about MPIRG, it should have allowed amendment 
of its complaint. 
The SG has filed a motion to affirm. On the jurisdic-
tional question, it insists that 28 u.s.c. §1252 is broad enough 
.. 
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to cover an appeal taken from a dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
54 (b). Section 1252 says that "[a] 11 appeals • . • taken to 
other courts prior to • notice [of appeal under this Section] 
shall be treated as taken directly to the Supreme Court." (empha-
sis added). The policy of §1252 against splitting cases between 
appellate courts can be as relevant to Rule 54(b) appeals as to 
others. For example, if standing of the individual plaintiffs 
were an issue in the main appeal, it would make sense for the 
Court to consider the standing of the organization at the same 
time. 
The SG urges that the Court summarily affirm the DC on ~I\ 
j, ~ ;4h~ standing question. Appellant failed the Hunt requirement 
that there be a substantial link between the nature of the claim 
presented, the purposes of the organization, and the interests of 
the members. 
·-~~ iy..,,~ ( at the 
firms on 
If the Court does not affirm summarily, the SG urges 
Court take no action on this appeal. If the Court af-
the merits, the standing question will be moot. If the 
Court reverses on the merits, appellant likely will want to par-
ticipate in the DC in a further challenge to §1113 on the statu-
tory claim not reached by the DC. In that case, the Court can 
remand the standing question to the CA8 for decision. 
4. DISCUSSION: No. 83-276 looks like a clear grant. 
The DC's decision has wide ranging significance and is not so 
clearly right or wrong that the Court should address it summari-
ly. 
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been able to find an easy answer to MPIRG's argument that 28 
u.s.c. §1252 does not cover it. The Court has emphasized that 
§1252 brings before the Court not only the constitutional ques-
tion, but the whole case. See McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 
21, 31 (1975}. Thus, it is clear that any issues between the 
parties in the DC can be presented in a §1252 appeal. I have 
found no case, however, addressing the question whether a party 
dismissed for lack of standing in the DC should be considered a 
party under §1252. The government's interpretation is reasonable 
but, in my view, not compelled. The provision for appeals taken 
to other courts prior to notice of appeal to this Court could 
refer only to appeals by parties that happen to get filed before 
another party seeks review in this Court. The broad language of 
§1252 appears to be concerned primarily with making clear that 
appeal under §1252 is not like interlocutory review of one aspect 
of the proceeding below, but enables the Court to decide the 
case. As the government urges, the Court can decide this case 
without reaching the standing question. 
On the other hand, the government has a point that in 
some cases, it would make sense for the Court to be able to ad-
dress a claim presented by a separate Rule 54 (b} appeal. 28 
u.s.c. §1252 on its face is broad enough to give the Court juris-
diction to hear a Rule 54(b} appeal. 28 u.s.c. §1252, however, 
does not require the Court to address all of the issues brought 
v?:
efo e it under that section. See FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 
R U.S. 977 (1957}. Thus, the most sensible course appears to 
he second option recommended by the government--to hold this 
. . . 
"' 
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jurisdictional statement until the Court addresses the merits of 
the injunction question and then, if necessary, to remand to the 
CA8. The standing question is not so obvious as to warrant sum-
mary disposition, but neither is it significant enough to warrant 
the Court's attention. 
One argument against the recommended course is that 
appellant claims unfairness in having had to file a brief in the 
CA8, then file a jurisdictional statement here, all the while 
running the risk that neither court will ever address its claims. 
The government responds that appellant delayed in perfecting its 
appeal to the CA8 and in fact filed its brief there after the 
government had given notice of appeal to this Court. If appel-
lant had acted more quickly, the CA8 might have addressed its 
standing argument before notice of appeal to this Court. In this 
case, I am persuaded that appellant cannot claim too much preju-
dice. Appellant must have been aware of the risk of its appeal 
becoming moot. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend a grant in No. 83-276. 
I recommend that No. 83-637 be held pending disposition of No. 
83-276. 
There are two amicus briefs and a response in No. 83-
276. There is a response in No. 83-637. 
November 22, 1983 Taylor opn in petn 
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83-276 Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public 
Interest Group 
MEMO TO FILE 
This is the case in which a judge in 
Minnesota invalidated 
Authorization Act of 
Section 1113 
district 
of the Defense 
1933. 
those who fail to register 
This section provides that 
as required by the Military 
Selective Service Act (that was "reactivated by President 
Carter on July 2, 1980) shall be ineligibile for 
assistance (student loans) under Title IV of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965. 
The District Court held that the Act denying student 
aid constituted a "bill of attainder" as it "singles out 
an ascertainable group based on past conduct" and 
"legislatively determines the guilt of this ascertainable 
group". The Court also viewed the denial of aid as 
"punishment" because it affected students of limited means 
as contrasted with more affluent students. Finally, the 
DC concluded that the Act compelled self incrimination. 
• 
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My recollection is that the vote to "Note" was 
unanimous, as the DC issued a nationwide injunction 
against the single most effective means of enforcing the 
Selective Service Act. 
'Ihe brief filed on behalf of the Minnesota Civil 
Liberties Union and the ACLU predictably supports and 
argues the same grounds urged upon - and accepted by - the 
DC. In my view, each of these grounds if frivolous. I 
find the SG's brief and reply brief convincing. 
Before identifying more specifically the issues, 
just a word about the legislative history. The 1982 Act, 
adopted to implement the Selective Service Act, was passed 
by overwhelming bipartisan majorities in each House after 
full debate. Under Title IV, a person who wishes a grant 
is required to register and file a "statement of 
compliance" - meaning that he has registered under the 
Selective Service Act or has a satisfactory reason for not 
doing so. 
It is clear from the legislative history that Section 
1113 was enacted to encourage registration and to promote 
a fair allocation fo scarce federal aid dollars by not 
rewarding those who failed to register. 
- - 3. 
I now note very briefly the alleged 
constitutional defects and the SG's answers: 
1. Bill of Attainder. Relying on Article I, Section 
9, clause 3 of the Constitution, appellees argue that the 
statute is a bill of attainder becasuse ( i) It determines 
guilt of an individual or group; (ii) inflicts punishment; 
and (iii) does so "without the protection of a judicial 
trial." 
The SG says that Section 1113 has none of the 
attributes of a bill of attainder. By definition, "bills 
of attainders legislatively punish specific individuals or 
groups without trial". Section 1113 is not "directed 
against any specific individual or group. Most bills of 
attainder preceded the Revolution and named groups or 
specific parties, and because it was directed against 
"past conduct". Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 
86 (1966). Section 1113 identifies no group by reference 
to "past conduct". It creates an open - not a closed -
class. .. -
It is comparable to the Veterans Benefit Act that 
grants educational benefits to persons who choose to 
serve in the armed forces, withholding such benefits from 
those who did not serve. 
- - 4. 
The parties debate the meaning of Section III of the 
Selective Service Act that on its face appears to require 
registration not later than thirty days after the 
registrant's 18th birthday, and would deny eligibility for 
federal aid where this is not done. The SG answers by 
saying that regulations, adopted shortly after enactment 
of Section 1113, "permit late registrants to receive aid". 
34 cfr. 668.27(b) (1). Seep. 4 of SG's reply brief. 
Appellees argue that the regulations permitting late 
registration are void as inconsistent with the expressed 
terms of the statute. Even if this were true, there would 
be a question of standing - at least so it seems to me -
to complain about regulations that are favorable to 
appellees. The SG states the no late registrant has ever 
been denied federal aid simply because of a late 
registration. 
In any event, it is clear that a statute that broadly 
affects, without discrimination, an entire age group of 
young men solely for the purpose of serving their country, 
is not a bill of atainder. 
2. Punishment ( 9 f- J..,J,-, -+<..~/.rvtt) 
Contrary to what the DC held and appellees argue, 
Section 1113 does not "inflict punishment". It is 
~~ 
(),VIV 
- - 5. 
regulatory. If requiring young men to serve their country 
-....:. 
0 
is punishment per se, then every nation - including 
America - that has adopted compulsory military 
(whether in war or peace) has imposed punishment. 
The legislative history shows that 
service 
Congress 
recognized that many who had failed to register had done 
so inadvertently with no intention to violate the law. 
This recognition is reflected in the regulation, and the 
way in which Section 1113 uniformly has been construed and 
applied. 
3. Self-incrimination 
I agree with the SG that the DC' s view - echoed by 
appellees that Section 1113 is invalid because it 
compels persons to incriminate th ems elves is frivolous. 
The statute ~o~ ~~s.t..,w~ f ~ 
federal aid. Moreover, Congress legitimately may declare 
non-registrants ineligible for Title IV federal grants or 
aids. There is no "punishment" unless the 
decides to prosecute them for failure to register. 
* * * 
Although the ACLU, in 
acting professionally - though in 
~~~ 
~~?d 
? ~ ~ ... - / 
is 
misguided - it 
~~fk 
~~ 
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is destressing to see the amicus breifs filed by colleges 
and universities. 
One must wonder whether they are putting their own 
interest above the interest of our country. At times it 
seems that the people who are most zealous in asserting 
their "rights" - including the right to the liberties we 
all cherish - are singularly less inclined to be willing 
to defend them. This has not been the history of our 
country or, perhaps until recently, of the dwindling group 
of countries in which freedom still exists. 
LFP, JR. 
- -
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From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: IIAY 2 2 1984 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
~
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 7 ,~  
No. 83-276 ~·~ 
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, ET AL., APPELLANTS L-t.... v---
v. MINNESOTA PUBLIC INTEREST 
RESEARCH GROUP ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
[May -, 1984] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to decide (a) whether§ 1113 
of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983, 
which denies federal financial assistance under title IV of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 to male students who fail to 
register for the draft under the Military Selective Service 
Act, is a Bill of Attainder; and (b) whether § 1113 compels 
those students who elect to request federal aid to incriminate 
1? 
~~ 






themselves in violation of the ;ifth Amendment. 
Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. 4'-c-f4._/2 - &.A--
App. § 453 (Supp. V), empowers the President to require ~ ~ 
every male citizen and male resident alien between the ages 
of 18 and 26 to register for the draft. Section 12 of that Act ~ ~ 
imposes criminal penalties for failure to register. On July 2, f 
1980, President Carter issued a proclamation requiring ,le:;r,.,. .Jr,~~~ ,1.._ ~ 
young men to register within 30 days of their eighteenth 1- • :-.:._ ___, ""1/ _ _ 
birthday. Procl. No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45247 (1980). ~ -~M!Hl 
Appellees are anonymous individuals who were required to 'fl'~ 'f2 ~ ~ . 
register before September 1, 1982. On September 8, Con- · ~ 
gress enacted the Department of Defense Authorization Act ~ f 
of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 et seq. Section 
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1113(f)(l) provides that any person who is required to regis-
ter and fails to do so "in accordance with any proclamation" 
issued under the Military Selective Service Act "shall be inel-
igible for any form of assistance or benefit provided under 
title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965." 1 Section 
1113(f)(2) requires applicants for title IV assistance to file 
with their institutions of higher education a statement attest-
ing to their compliance with the draft registration law and 
regulations issued under it. Sections 1113(f)(3) and (4) re-
quire the Secretary of Education, in agreement with the Di-
rector of Selective Service, to prescribe methods for verify-
ing such statements of compliance and to issue implementing 
regulations. 
Regulations issued in final form on April 11, 1983, see 48 
Fed. Reg. 15578 (1983), provide that no applicant may re-
ceive title IV aid unless he files a statement of compliance 
certifying that he is registered with the Selective Service or 
that, for a specified reason, he is not required to register. 34 
CFR § 668.24(a) (1983). The regulations allow a student who 
has not previously registered, although required to do so, to 
establish eligibility for title IV aid by registering, filing a 
statement of registration compliance, and, if·required, verify-
ing that he is registered. Id. § 668.27(b)(l). The statement 
of compliance does not require the applicant to state the date 
that he registered. 2 
1 Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U. S. C .. § 1070 et seq. , 
provides financial assistance to qualified students in postsecondary educa-
tional programs. Title IV aid is available at both colleges and universities, 
as well as at numerous kinds of business, trade and technical schools. Id. 
§§ 1085(b), (c), 1088. 
2 The Regulations include a model statement of registration compliance 
that the Secretary of Education has indicated satisfy the requirements of 
34 CFR § 668.24(a) (1983): 
"STATEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE/ 
REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE 
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In November 1982 the Minnesota Public Interest Research 
Group filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the District of Minnesota seeking to enjoin the operation 
of § 1113. The District Court dismissed the Minnesota 
Group for lack of standing but allowed three anonymous stu-
dents to intervene as plaintiffs. 557 F. Supp. 923 (1983); 557 
F. Supp. 925 (1983). The intervenors alleged that they re-
side in Minnesota, that they need financial aid to pursue their 
educations, that they intend to apply for title IV assistance, 
and that they are legally required to register with the Selec-
tive Service but have failed to do so. This suit was infor-
mally consolidated with a separate action brought by three 
other anonymous students making essentially the same alle-
gations as the intervenors. 
In March 1983 the District Court granted a preliminary in-
junction restraining the Selective Service System from en-
forcing § 1113. After finding that appellees had demon-
strated a threat of irreparable injury, the court held that 
appellees were likely to succeed on the merits. First, the 
District Court thought it likely that § 1113 was a Bill of At-
tainder. The court interpreted the statutory bar to student 
aid as applicable to students who registered late. Thus in-
terpret~d, the statute "clearly singles out an ascertainable 
--I certify that I am not required to be register with Selective Serv-
ice, because: 
--I am female. 
--I am in the armed services on active duty (Note: Members of the 
Reserves and National Guard are not considered on active duty.) 
--I have not reached my 18th birthday. 
--I was born before 1960. 
--I am a permanent resident of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands or the Northern Mariana Islands. 
--I certify that I am registered with Selective Service. 
Signature: ---------------
Date:-----------------
NOTICE: You will not receive title IV financial aid unless you complete 
this statement statement and, ifrequired, give proof to your school of your 
registration compliance .... " 34 CFR § 668.25 (1983). 
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group based on past conduct" and "legislatively determines 
the guilt of this ascertainable group." 557 F. Supp. 937, 942, 
943 (1983). The court viewed the denial of aid as punishment 
within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause because it 
"deprives students of the practical means to achieve the edu-
cation necessary to pursue many vocations in our society." 
Id., at 944. Second, the District Court found it likely that 
§ 1113 violated appellees' Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination. In the District Court's view, 
the statement of compliance required by§ 1113 compels stu-
dents who have not registered for the draft and need financial 
aid to confess to the fact of nonregistration, which is a crime. 
50 U. S. C. §462. 
On June 16, 1983, the District Court ent ed a permanent, 
nationwide injunction against the enforcement of 1 13. 
The court held that the regulations making late registrants 
eligible for aid were inconsistent with the statute and con-
cluded that the statute was an unconstitutional attainder. It 
also held the statute to violate appellees' constitutional privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination. 
On June 29, we stayed the District Court's June 16 order 
pending the timely docketing and final disposition of this ap-
peal. We noted probable jurisdiction on December 5, 1983, 
-- U. S. --, and we reverse. 
II 
The District Court held that § 1113 falls within the cate-
gory of congressional actions that Article 1, § 9, Clause 3 of 
the Constitution bars by providing that "[n]o Bill of Attain-
der ... shall be passed." A Bill of Attainder was most re-
cently described by this Court as "a law that legislatively de-
termines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable 
individual without provision of the protections of a judicial 
trial." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 
U. S. 425, 468 (1977); see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 
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315 (1946). The Government argues that § 1113 does not sat-
isfy ny of these three ~cification of the 
affecte persons, punishment, and lack of a judicial trial. 3 
A 
In forbidding Bills of Attainder, the draftsmen of the Con-
stitution sought to prohibit the ancient practice of the Parlia-
ment in England of punishing without trial "specifically d~s-
ignated persons or groups." United States v. Brown, 381 
U.S. 437, 447""(1965). 1Iistorically, Bills of Attainder gener-
ally named the persons to be punished. However, "[t]he sin-
gling out of an individual for legislatively prescribed punish-
ment constitutes an attainder whether the individual is called 
by name or described in terms of conduct which, because it is 
past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular per-
sons." Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control 
Board, 367 U. S. 1, 86 (1962). When past activity serves as 
'.'a point of reference for the ascertainment of particular per~ 
sons ineluctably designated by the legislature" for punish-
ment, id., at 87, the Act may be an attainder. See Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 324 (1867). 
In Cummings the Court 1 ~truck down 1 provision of the ? 
Missouri post-Civil War R~ nstrucflon Constitution that 
barred persons from various professions unless they stated 
under oath that they had not given aid or comfort to persons 
engaged in armed hostility to the United States and had 
never "'been a member of, or connected with, any order, so-
ciety, or organization, inimical to the government of the 
3 We agree with the Government that the statute does not single out an 
identifiable group and that the denial of title IV aid does not constitute 
punishment. The Government also argues that § 1113 does not dispense 
with a judicial trial, noting that a hearing is provided in the event of dis-
agreement between the applicant and the Secretary about whether the ap-
plicant has registered, 96 Stat. 748 (subsection (f)(4)), and that the decision 
made at that hearing is subject to judicial review. The Government's ar-
gument is meritless. Congress has not provided a judicial trial to those 
affected by the statute. 
i 
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United States."' Id., at 279. The Court recognized that 
the oath was required, not "as a means of ascertaining 
whether parties were qualified" for their professions, id., at 
320, but rather to effect a punishment for having associated 
with the Confederacy. Although the State constitution did 
not mention the persons or groups required to take the oath 
by name, the Court concluded that in creating a qualification 
having no possible relation to their fitness for their chosen 
professions, the constitution was intended "to reach the per-
son, not the calling." Ibid. 
On the same day that it decided Cummings , the Court 
~tuck downJ smiilar oatli t1latwasrequirecffor adrmssion to 
practice law in the federal courts. Ex parle Garland, 4 
Wall. 333 (1867). Like the oath considered in Cummings, 
the oath "operate[d] as a legislative decree of perpetual ex-
clusion" from the practice of law, id., at 377, since past affili-
ation with the Confederacy prevented attorneys from taking 
the oath without perjuring themselves. See Cummings v. 
Missouri, supra, at 327. In both Cummings and Garland, 
the persons in the group disqualified were defined entirely by 
irreversible acts committed by them. 
The District Court in this case viewed§ 1113 as comparable 
to the provisions of the Reconstruction laws declared uncon-
stitutional in Cummings and Garland, because it thought the 
statute singled out nonregistrants and made them ineligible 
for aid based on their past conduct, i. e. , failure to register. 
To understand the District Court's analysis, it is necessary to 
turn to its construction of the statute. The court noted that 
§ 1113 disqualifies applicants for financial assistance unless 
they have registered "in accordance with any proclamation is-
sued under section 3 [of the Military Selective Service Act]," 
and that Proclamation No. 4771 requires those born after 
January 1, 1963, to register within 30 days of their eigh-
teenth birthday. See 45 Fed. Reg. 45247 (1980). In the 
court's view, the language of§ 1113, coupled with the proc-
lamation's 30-day registration requirement, precluded late 
Jg~ 7 
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registrants from qualifying for title IV aid. Having con-
strued § 1113 as precluding late registration, the District 
Court read the statute to be retrospective, in that it denies 
financial assistance to an identifiable group-
nonregistrants-based on their past conduct. The District 
Court acknowledged that implementing regulations would 
allow students who had not previously registered to become 
eligible for title IV benefits by registering, see 34 CFR 
§ 668.27(b)(l), but the court declared those regulations to be 
void because they conflicted with what the District Court 
viewed as § 1113's requirement of registration within the 
time prescribed by Proclamation No. 4771. 
We reject the District Court's view that § 1113 requires -z 
registration within t e time ed y roe amat10n o. 4 771. 
That view is piamly inconsis"tent wifll tlie structure of § 1113 
and with the legislative history. Subs~ction (f)H ) ofJ the 
s~ e i::e uires the Secretary of Education to issue regula-
tio_n~ at "any person to whom t e ecretary pro-
poses to denytitle IV assistance shall be given notice of the 
proposed denial and "not less than thirty days" after such no-
tice to "establis[h] that he has complied with the registra-
tion requirement." 50 U. S. C. §462(f)(4). The statute 
clearly gives nonregistrants 30 days after receiving notice 
that they are ineligible for title IV aid to register for the 
draft and qualify for aid. See 34 CFR § 668.27(b)(l). To re-
quire registration within the time fixed by the presidential 
proclamation would undermine this provision allowing "any 
person" 30 days after notification to establish compliance 
with the registration requirement. This was clearly a grace 
period. 
The District Court also ignored the relevant legislative his-
tory. Congress' purpose in enacting§ 1113 was to encourage 
registration by those who must register, but have not yet 
done so. 4 Proponents of the legislation emphasized that 
4 128 Cong. Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. White-
hurst); i d. , at H4758 (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at H4770 (remarks of 
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those failing to register timely can qualify for aid by register-
ing late. 6 The District Court failed to take account of this 
legislative purpose. See Heckler v. Edwards, -- U. S. 
-- (1984). Nor did its construction of§ 1113 give adequate 
deference to the views of the Secretary of Education, who 
had helped to draft the statute. Miller v. Youakim, 440 
U. S. 144 (1979); see 128 Cong. Rec. H4764 (daily ed. July 28, 
1982) (remarks of Rep. Solomon). 
The judicial function is "not to destroy the Act if we can, 
but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so 
as to comport with constitutional limitations," CSC v. Letter 
Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 571 (1973). 6 Section 1113 does not 
make late registrants ineligible for title IV aid. 
Because it allows late registration, § 1113 is clearly distin-
guishable from the provisions struck down in Cummings and 
Garland. 7 Cummings and G~ with absolute bar-
Rep. Stratton); 128 Cong. Rec. S4943 (daily ed. May 12, 1978) (remarks of 
Sen. Hayakawa); id., at S4945 (remarks of Sen. Jepsen). 
5 128 Cong. Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. 
Whitehurst); id., at H4758 (remarks of Rep. Simon); id., at H4769 (re-
marks of Rep. Montgomery); id., at H4770 (remarks of Rep. Stratton). 
As Senator Stennis stated: 
"I thought of the proposition here where some youngster might have 
overlooked signing up or might have misunderstood it or had not been cor-
rectly informed, but he is not going to be penalized for that because he still 
has complete control of the situation. All he will have to do is just to com-
ply with the law, and that will automatically make him eligible so far as this 
prohibition or restriction is concerned." 128 Cong. Rec. S4945 (daily ed. 
May 12, 1982). 
6 As the Solicitor General points out, one construction of the statute that 
avoids a constitutional problem is to make aid contingent on registration in 
the manner, but not the time, required by any proclamation. See Proc-
lamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45248 (1980) ("Persons who are required 
to be registered shall comply with the registration procedures and other 
rules and regulations prescribed by the Director of Selective Service.") 
7 All of the appellees in this case had failed to comply with the registra-
tion requirements when § 1113 was enacted. As to eighteen-year-olds 
who have entered the class of nonregistrants after August 9, 1982-thirty 
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riers to entry into certain professions for those who could not 
file the required loyalty oaths; noone who had served the 
Confederacy could possible comply, for his status was irre-
versible. By contrast, § 1113's requirements, far from irre-
versible, can ~y~~ly or late filing. 
"Far from attaching to ... past and ineradicable actions," 
ineligibility for title IV benefits "is made to turn upon 
continuingly ·contemporaneous fact" which a student who 
wants public assistance can correct. Communist Party v. 
Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 87 (1962). 
B r" 
Even if the s~ecificit~ ment ~ e deemed satisfied by 
! 1113, the statute would not necessarily implicate the Bill of 
Attainder Clause. The proscription against Bills of Attain-
der reaches only statutes that inflict punishment on the speci-
fied individual or group. In determining whether a statute 
inflicts punishment within the proscription against Bills of 
Attainder, our holdings recognize that the severity of a sanc-
tion is not determinative of its character as punishment. 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 616 and n. 9 (1960). 
That burdens are placed on citizens by federal authority does . 
not make those burdens punishment. Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 470 (1977); United 
States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 8 Conversely, legislative intent to encourage 
compliance with the law does not establish that a statute is 
merely the legitimate regulation of conduct. Punishment is 
not limited solely to retribution for past events, but may in-
volve deprivations inflicted to deter future misconduct. 
eligibility for financial aid is merely a deprivation in addition to potential 
criminal liability for the failure to register for the draft. 
8 "The fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not 
make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may 
be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be en-
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United States v. Brown, 381 U. S., at 458--459. It is thus 
apparent that, though the governing criteria for an attainder 
may be readily indicated, "each case has turned on its own 
highly particularized context." Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 
at 616. 
In deciding wh~~ute inflicts forbidden punish-
ment, we have recognized three necessary mqmr1es: (1) 
whether the challenged statute falls within the historical 
meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, 
"viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens im-
posed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legisla-
tive purposes"; and (3) whether the legislative record 
"evinces a congressional intent to punish." Nixon, supra, at 
473, 475-476, 478. We conclude that under these criteria 
§ 1113 is not a punitive Bill of Attainder. 
1 
At common law, Bills of Attainder often imposed the death 
penalty; lesser punishments were imposed by bills of pains 
and penalties. The Constitution proscribes these lesser pen-
alties as well those imposing death. Cummings v. Missouri, 
4 Wall., at 323. Historically used in England in times of re-
bellion or "violent political excitements," ibid., bills of pains 
and penalties commonly imposed imprisonment, banishment, 
and the punitive confiscation of property. Nixon, supra, at 
474. In our own country, the list of punishments forbidden 
by the Bill of Attainder Clause has expanded to include legis-
lative bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific 
employments or professions. 9 
Section 1113 imposes none of the burdens historically asso-
ciated with punishment. As this Court held in Flemming v. 
•See, e.g., United States v. Brown, supra, in which Communist Party 
members were barred from offices in labor unions; United States v. Lovett, 
supra, in which the law in question cut off salaries to three named govern-
ment employees; Cummings v. Missouri, supra, in which a priest was dis-
qualified from practicing as a clergyman; and Ex parte Garland, supra, in 
which lawyers were barred from the practice of law. 
p r 1so vi 
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Nestor, 363 U. S., at 617, "the sanction is the mere denial of a 
noncontractual governmental benefit. No affirmative dis-
ability or restraint is imposed," and Congress has inflicted 
"nothing approaching the 1infamous punishment' of imprison-
ment" or other disabilities historically associated with 
punishment. 10 
!Jt:;;;;;:-
Congress did not even deprive appellees of title IV benefits 
permanently; appellees can become eligible for title IV aid at 
any time simply by registering late and thus'1carry the keys of 
their .-=;:t°? a:• tin their own pockets~, Shillitani v. United 
States, 384 U. S. 364, 368 (1966). A statute that leaves open 
perpetually the possibility of qualifying for aid does not fall 






Our inquiry does not end with a determination that § 1113 
does not inflict punishment in its historical sense. To ensure 
that the legislature has not created an impermissible penalty 
not previously held to be within the proscription against Bills 
of Attainder, we must determine whether the challenged 
10 Appellees argue that the underpinnings of Flemming have been re-
moved by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262 (1970), and Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332 (1976). Goldberg held only that public assist-
ance "benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to 
receive them," 397 U. S. , at 262, and that Due Process affords qualified 
recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing to guard against errone-
ous termination. The Court stressed that "the crucial factor in this con-
text . .. is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over 
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to 
live while he waits." Id. , at 264 (emphasis in original). Mathews reached 
the same conclusion with respect to disability benefits. Even Flemming 
noted that the interest of a covered employee under the Social Security Act 
"fall[s] within the protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded 
by the Due Process Clause," 363 U. S., at 611, while holding that Con-
gress' disqualification of certain deportees from receipt of Social Security 
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statute can be reasonably said to further nonpunitive goals. 
Nixon, 433 U. S., at 475-476. 
The legislative history reflects that § 1113 represents the 
considered Congressional decision to further nonpunitive leg-
islative goals. Congress was well aware that more than half 
a million young men had failed to comply with the registra-
tion requirement. 11 The legislators emphasized that one of 
the primary purposes of§ 1113 was to encourage those re-
quired to register to do so. 12 
Conditioning receipt of title IV aid on registration is 
plainly ~ rational means to improve compliance with the reg-
istration requirement. Since the group of young men who 
must register for the draft overlaps in large part with the 
group of students who are eligible for title IV aid, 13 Congress 
reasonably concluded that § 1113 would be a strong tonic to 
many nonregistrants. 
Section 1113 also furthers a fair allocation of scarce federal 
resources by limiting title IV aid to those who are willing to 
meet their responsibilities to the United States by register-
ing with the Selective Service when required to do so. As 
one senator stated: 
"This amendment seeks not only fo increase compliance with 
the registration requirement but also to insure the most fair 
and just usage of Federal education benefits. During these 
11 See, e. g., 128 Cong. Rec. H4758 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of 
Rep. Solomon); 128 Cong. Rec. S4945 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of 
Sen. Jepsen). 
12 See 128 Cong. Rec. H4758 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. 
Solomon); id., at H4770 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); 128 Cong. Rec. S4943 
(daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); id., at S4945 (re-
marks of Sen. Stennis); i bid. (remarks of Sen. Jepsen). 
13 The Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S. C. §453, requires certain 
males between the ages of 18 and 26 to register. Those who fail to regis-
ter, though required to do so, are a significant part of the class to which 
title IV assistance is otherwise offered. Title IV aid is available for a 
broad range of postsecondary educational programs at colleges, universi-
ties, and vocational schools. 20 U. S. C. § 1085(a); seen. 1, supra. 
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times of extreme ·budgetary constraints, times when even the 
most worthwhile programs are cut back drastically, this Gov-
ernment has every obligation to see that Federal dollars are 
spent in the most fair and prudent manner possible. . . . If 
students want to further their education at the expense of ) ~ . . 
their country, they cannot expect these benefits to be pro-
vided without accepting their fair share of the responsiblities 
to that Government. "14 
Certain aspects of the legislation belie the view that § 1113 
is a punitive measure. Section 1113 denies title IV benefits 
to innocent as well as willful non:registrants. Yet punitive 
legislation ordinarily does not reach those whose failure to 
comply with the law is not willful. Thus, in stressing that 
the legislation would reach unintentional violators, 128 Cong. 
Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Solo-
mon); id. , at H4759 (remarks of Rep. Simon); 128 Cong. Rec. 
S4945 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Stennis), pro-
ponents indicated that they intended to regulate all 
nonregistrants, rather than to single out intentional 
nonregistrants for punishment. In this same nonpunitive 
spirit, Congress also allowed all nonregistrants to qualify for 
title IV aid simply by registering late, instead of choosing to 
punish willful nonregistrants by denying them benefits even 
if they registered belatedly. 
We see therefore that the legislative history provides con-
vincing support for the view that, in enacting § 1113, Con-
gress sought, not to punish anyone, 15 but to promote compli-
- = -- ---14 128 Cong. Rec. S4943-4944 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. 
Hayakawa); see also id. , at S4943 (remarks of Sen. Mattingly); 128 Cong. 
Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of R~ Montgoqiery). 
15 Applying the third part of the Nixon test, the District Court concluded 
that § 1113 is a punitive measure. But the District Court relied in part on 
the statements of legislators who opposed the statute because they thought 
the statute punished nonregistrants. 128 Cong. Rec. H4760 (daily ed. 
July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Edgar); id. , at H4761 (remarks of Rep. 
Goldwater); 128 Cong. Rec. S4944 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of 
Sen. Durenburger). These statements are entitled to little, if any, 
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ance with the draft registration requirement and fairness in 
the allocation of scarce federal resources. Section 1113 
clearly furthers nonpunitive legislative goals. 
C 
Because § 1113 does not single out an identifiable group 
that would be ineligible for title IV aid or inflict punishment 
within the meaning of Bill of Attainder Clause, we hold that 
the District Court erred in striking down§ 1113 as an imper-
missible attainder. 
III 
Appellees assert that§ 1113 compels nonregistrants to con-
fess that they have failed to register on time when certifying 
to their schools that they have complied with the registration 
law. They note that the willful failure to register within the 
time fixed by Proclamation No. 4771 is a criminal offense 
punishable under 50 U. S. C. § 462 and contend that § 1113 
thus compels them to confess to a crime in violation of their 
Fifth Amendment rights. Appellees, however, are simply 
ineligible for title IV aid because they have not complied with 
a valid statutory requirement. They will not qualify for that 
aid even if they acknowledge that they have not registered. 
Section 1113 thus offers nonregistrants no incentive at all to 
confess to a crime. 
Even if appellees were to register late, they could obtain 
title IV aid without providing any incriminating information. 
weight, since they were made by opponents of the legislation. 
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395 
(1951). 
The District Court also relied on several isolated statements expressing 
understandable indignation over the decision of some nonregistrants to 
show their defiance of the law. See 128 Cong. Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 
28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Montgomery); 128 Cong. Rec. S4944 (daily ed. 
May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa). But such statements do not 
constitute "the unmistakable evidence of punitive intent which ... is re-
quired before a Congressional enactment of this kind may be struck down." 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. , at 619. 
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The statement of registration compliance requires only that 
students certify that they have complied with the registra-
tion laws, and does not require them to disclose whether they 
are late registrants. See n. 2, supra. Disclosure by 
nonregistrants of any incriminating information is therefore 
not a condition to obtaining title IV aid. 
The Government admits that a student cannot register late 
without disclosing that his action is untimely, since the draft 
registration card that a registrant completes at the post of-
fice must be dated and contain the registrant's date of birth. 
32 CFR § 1615.4. This raises the question-not addressed 
by the District Court or pressed by appellees-whether 
§ 1113 violates their Fifth Amendment rights because it com-
pels them to register late and admit their offense. Because 
appellees have not sought to register, however, it would be 
premature to decide whether their Fifth Amendment rights 
would be violated if they admitted their violation while 
registering. 
We do note two difficulties with the Fifth Amendment 
claim. First, it is not apparent that§ 1113 compels appellees 
to register. Although this Court has held that threatening a 
public employee with loss of employment unless he testifies 
constitutes compulsion, Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 
801 (1977), Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273 (1968), it 
does not necessarily follow that it is compulsion to off er ap-
pellees benefits such as title IV aid in exchange for stating 
their dates of birth. Second, even ifwe held that§ 1113 com-
pels appellees to register, the Government has not yet in-
sisted upon disclosure of a date of birth in the face of a late-
registering student's invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. While holding that the Government may not com-
pel testimony by imposing sanctions such as loss of employ-
ment, Lefkowitz, supra; Gardner, supra, we have stressed 
that those who are asked incriminating questions generally 
must first invoke the privilege before they have a cognizable 
Fifth Amendment claim, Minnesota v. Murphy, -- U.S. 
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-- (1984). The Court has also emphasized that "[a]nswers 
may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immu-
nity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or 
its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the 
person testifying." Gardner, supra, at 276. 
Because appellees have not sought to register, they have 
not asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege when asked to 
state their dates of birth and the Government has not refused 
any request for immunity for their answers or otherwise 
threatened them with penalties for invoking the privilege. 
Under these circumstances, appellees cannot complain that 
§ 1113 violates their Fifth Amendment rights by forcing them 
to admit their crimes during registration. 16 
IV 
We conclude that § 1113 does not violate the P,roscription 
against Bills of Attainder. Nor have appelleesDtaised a cog-
nizable claim under the Fifth Amendment. 
The judgment of the District Court is 
Reversed. 
1
• Appellees also assert that § 1113 violates equal ·protection because it 
discriminates against less wealthy nonregistrants. That argument is 
meritless. Section 1113 treats all nonregistr.ants alike, denying aid to both 
the poor and the wealthy. But even if the statute discriminated against 
poor nonregistrants because more wealthy nonregistrants could continue 
to pay for their postsecondary educations, the statute must be sustained if 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Harris v. McRae, 
448 U. S. 297, 322--324 (1980). That standard is easily met here, because \ 
§ 1113 is rationally related to the legitimate government objectives of en-
couraging registration and fairly allocating scarce federal resources. See 
su-pra, at --. 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-276 
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM ET AL. v. MINNESOTA 
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
[May - , 1984] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to decide (a) whether§ 1113 
of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983, 
which denies federal financial assistance under title IV of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 to male students who fail to 
register for the draft under the Military Selective Service 
Act, is a Bill of Attainder; and (b) whether § 1113 compels 
those students who elect to request federal aid to incriminate 
themselves in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
I 
Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. 
App. § 453 (Supp. V), empowers the President to require 
every male citizen and male resident alien between the ages 
of 18 and 26 to register for the draft. Section 12 of that Act 
imposes criminal penalties for failure to register. On July 2, 
1980, President Carter issued a proclamation requiring 
young men to register within 30 days of their eighteenth 
birthday. Procl. No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45247 (1980). 
Appellees are anonymous individuals who were required to 
register before September 1, 1982. On September 8, Con-
gress enacted the Department of Defense Authorization Act 
of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 et seq. Section 
1113(0 (1) provides that any person who is required to regis-
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issued under the Military Selective Service Act "shall be inel-
igible for any form of assistance or benefit provided under 
title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965." 1 Section 
1113(f)(2) requires applicants for title IV assistance to file 
with their institutions of higher education a statement attest-
ing to their compliance with the draft registration law and 
regulations issued under it. Sections 1113(f)(3) and (4) re-
quire the Secretary of Education, in agreement with the Di-
rector of Selective Service, to prescribe methods for verify-
ing such statements of compliance and to issue implementing 
regulations. 
Regulations issued in final form on April 11, 1983, see 48 
Fed. Reg. 15578 (1983), provide that no applicant may re-
ceive title IV aid unless he files a statement of compliance 
certifying that he is registered with the Selective Service or 
that, for a specified reason, he is not required to register. 34 
CFR § 668.24(a) (1983). The regulations allow a student who 
has not previously registered, although required to do so, to 
establish eligibility for title IV aid by registering, filing a 
statement of registration compliance, and, if required, verify-
ing that he is registered. Id. § 668.27(b)(l). The statement 
of compliance does not require the applicant to state the date 
that he registered. 2 
1 Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U. S. C. § 1070 et seq., 
provides financial assistance to qualified students in postsecondary educa-
tional programs. Title IV aid is available at both colleges and universities, 
as well as at numerous kinds of business, trade and technical schools. Id. 
§§ 1085(b), (c), 1088. 
2 The Regulations include a model statement of registration compliance 
that the Secretary of Education has indicated satisfy the requirements of 
34 CFR § 668.24(a) (1983): 
"STATEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE/ 
REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE 
__ I certify that I am not required to be register with Selective Serv-
ice, because: 
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In November 1982 the Minnesota Public Interest Research 
Group filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the District of Minnesota seeking to enjoin the operation 
of § 1113. The District Court dismissed the Minnesota 
Group for lack of standing but allowed three anonymous stu-
dents to intervene as plaintiffs. 557 F. Supp. 923 (1983); 557 
F. Supp. 925 (1983). The intervenors alleged that they re-
side in Minnesota, that they need financial aid to pursue their 
educations, that they intend to apply for title IV assistance, 
and that they are legally required to register with the Selec-
tive Service but have failed to do so. This suit was infor-
mally consolidated with a separate action brought by three 
other anonymous students making essentially the same alle-
gations as the intervenors. 
In March 1983 the District Court granted a preliminary in-
junction restraining the Selective Service System from en-
forcing § 1113. After finding that appellees had demon-
strated a threat of irreparable injury, the court held that 
appellees were likely to succeed on the merits. First, the 
District Court thought it likely that § 1113 was a Bill of At-
tainder. The court interpreted the statutory bar to student 
aid as applicable to students who registered late. Thus in-
terpreted, the statute "clearly singles out an ascertainable 
group based on past conduct" and "legislatively determines 
_I am female. 
__ I am in the armed services on active duty (Note: Members of the 
Reserves and National Guard are not considered on active duty.) 
__ I have not reached my 18th birthday. 
__ I was born before 1960. 
__ I am a permanent resident of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands or the Northern Mariana Islands. 
__ I certify that I am registered with Selective Service. 
Signature: ______________________ _ 
Date: ________________________ _ 
NOTICE: You will not receive title IV financial aid unless you complete 
this statement statement and, ifrequired, give proof to your school of your 
registration compliance . .. . " 34 CFR § 668.25 (1983). 
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the guilt of this ascertainable group." 557 F. Supp. 937, 942, 
943 (1983). The court viewed the denial of aid as punishment 
within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause because it 
"deprives students of the practical means to achieve the edu-
cation necessary to pursue many vocations in our society." 
Id., at 944. Second, the District Court found it likely that 
§ 1113 violated appellees' Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination. In the District Court's view, 
the statement of compliance required by § 1113 compels stu-
dents who have not registered for the draft and need financial 
aid to confess to the fact of nonregistration, which is a crime. 
50 U. S. C. § 462. 
On June 16, 1983, the District Court entered a permanent, 
nationwide injunction against the enforcement of § 1113. 
The court held that the regulations making late registrants 
eligible for aid were inconsistent with the statute and con-
cluded that the statute was an unconstitutional attainder. It 
also held the statute to violate appellees' constitutional privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination. 
On June 29, we stayed the District Court's June 16 order 
pending the timely docketing and final disposition of this ap-
peal. We noted probable jurisdiction on December 5, 1983, 
-- U.S.--, and we reverse. 
II 
The District Court held that § 1113 falls within the cate-
gory of congressional actions that Article 1, § 9, Clause 3 of 
the Constitution bars by providing that "[n]o Bill of Attain-
der . . . shall be passed." A Bill of Attainder was most re-
cently described by this Court as "a law that legislatively de-
termines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable 
individual without provision of the protections of a judicial 
trial." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 
U. S. 425, 468 (1977); see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 
367, 383, n. 30 (1968); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 
315 (1946). The Government argues that § 1113 does not sat-
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isfy any of these three requirements, i. e., specification of the 
affected persons, punishment, and lack of a judicial trial. 3 
A 
In forbidding Bills of Attainder, the draftsmen of the Con-
stitution sought to prohibit the ancient practice of the Parlia-
ment in England of punishing without trial "specifically des-
ignated persons or groups." United States v. Brown, 381 
U. S. 437, 447 (1965). Historically, Bills of Attainder gener-
ally named the persons to be punished. However, "[t]he sin-
gling out of an individual for legislatively prescribed punish-
ment constitutes an attainder whether the individual is called 
by name or described in terms of conduct which, because it is 
past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular per-
sons." Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control 
Board, 367 U. S. 1, 86 (1962). When past activity serves as 
"a point of reference for the ascertainment of particular per-
sons ineluctably designated by the legislature" for punish-
ment, id., at 87, the Act may be an attainder. See Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 324 (1867). 
In Cummings the Court struck down a provision of the 
Missouri post-Civil War Reconstruction Constitution that 
barred persons from various professions unless they stated 
under oath that they had not given aid or comfort to persons 
engaged in armed hostility to the United States and had 
never "'been a member of, or connected with, any order, so-
ciety, or organization, inimical to the government of the 
United States."' Id., at 279. The Court recognized that 
l ' We agree with the Government that the statute does not single out an i identifiable group and that the denial of title IV aid does not constitute J punishment. The Government also argues that § 1113 does not dispense 
with a judicial trial, noting that a hearing is provided in the event of dis-
agreement between the applicant and the Secretary about whether the ap-
plicant has registered, 96 Stat. 748 (subsection (f)(4)), and that the decision 
made at that hearing is subject to judicial review. The Government's ar-
gument is meritless. Congress has not provided a judicial trial to those 
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the oath was required, not "as a means of ascertaining 
whether parties were qualified" for their professions, id., at 
320, but rather to effect a punishment for having associated 
with the Confederacy. Although the State constitution did 
not mention the persons or groups required to take the oath 
by name, the Court concluded that in creating a qualification 
having no possible relation to their fitness for their chosen 
professions, the constitution was intended "to reach the per-
son, not the calling." Ibid. 
On the same day that it decided Cummings, the Court 
struck down a similar oath that was required for admission to 
practice l aw in the federal courts. Ex parte Garland, 4 
Wall. 333 (1867). Like the oath considered in Cummings, 
the oath "operate[d] as a legislative decree of perpetual ex-
clusion" from the practice of law, id., at 377, since past affili-
ation with the Confederacy prevented attorneys from taking 
the oath without perjuring themselves. See Cummings v. 
Missouri, supra, at 327. In both Cummings and Garland, 
the persons in the group disqualified were defined entirely by 
irreversib e ct committed b them. 
The District Court in this case viewed § 1113 as comparable 
to the provisions of the Reconstruction laws declared uncon-
stitutional in Cummings and Garland, because it thought the 
statute singled out nonregistrants and made them ineligible 
for aid based on their past conduct, i. e., failure to register. 
To understand the District Court's analysis, it is necessary to 
turn to its construction of the statute. The court noted that 
§ 1113 disqualifies applicants for financial assistance unless 
they have registered "in accordance with any proclamation is-
sued under section 3 [of the Military Selective Service Act]," 
and that Proclamation No. 4771 requires those born after 
January 1, 1963, to register within 30 days of their eigh-
 ,_... teenth birthday. See 45 Fed. Reg. 45247 (1980). In the 
--4-1 ~,la court's view, the language of§ 1113, coupled with the proc-,b::r,~.::,J._ lamat n~ 30-day registration requirement, precluded late 
~~ an'ts from qualifying for title IV aid. Having con-
/hu_ ~ d 
~~ ~ d.r ... ,,~ ~ ~t-1- ~ ~ 
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strued § 1113 as precluding late registration, the District 
Court read the statute to be retrospective, in that it denies 
financial assistance to an identifiable group-
nonregistrants-based on their past conduct. The District 
Court acknowledged that implementing regulations would 
allow students who had not previously registered to become 
eligible for title IV benefits by registering, see 34 CFR 
§ 668.27(b)(l), but the court declared those regulations to be 
void because they conflicted with what the District Court 
viewed as § 1113's requirement of registration within the 
time prescribed by Proclamation No. 4771. 
We reject the District Court's view that § 1113 requires 
registration within the time fixed by Proclamation No. 4771. 
That view is plainly inconsistent with the structure of § 1H3 
and with the legislative history. Subsection (f)(4) of the 
statute requires the Secretary of Education to issue regula-
tions providing that "any person" to whom the Secretary pro-
poses to deny title IV assistance shall be given notice of the 
proposed denial and "not less than thirty days" after such no-
tice to "establis[h] that he has complied with the registra-
tion requirement." 50 U. S. C. § 462(f)(4). The statute 
clearly gives nonregistrants 30 days after receiving notice 
that they are ineligible for title IV aid to register for the 
draft and qualify for aid. See 34 CFR § 668.27(b)(l). To re-
quire registration within the time fixed by the presidential 
proclamation would undermine this provision allowing "any 
person" 30 days after notification to establish compliance 
with the registration requirement. This was clearly a grace 
period. 
The District Court also ignored the relevant legislative his-
tory. Congress' purpose in enacting§ 1113 was to encourage 
registration by those who must register, but have not yet 
done so. 4 Proponents of the legislation emphasized that 
4 128 Cong. Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. White-
hurst); id. , at H4758 (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at H4770 (remarks of 
8.>-27~OPINION 
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those failing to register timely can qualify for aid by register-
ing late. 5 The District Court failed to take account of this 
legislative purpose. See Heckler v. Edwards, -- V. S. 
-- (1984). Nor did its construction of§ 1113 give adequate 
deference to the views of the Secretary of Education, who 
had helped to draft the statute. Miller v. Youakim, 440 
U. S. 144 (1979); see 128 Cong. Rec. H4764 (daily ed. July 28, 
1982) (remarks of Rep. Solomon). 
The judicial function is "not to destroy the Act if we can, 
but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so 
as to comport with constitutional limitations," CSC v. Letter 
Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 571 (1973). 6 Section 1113 does not 
make late registrants ineligible for title IV aid. 
Because it allows late registration, § 1113 is clearly distin-
guishable from the provisions struck down in Cummings and 
Garland. 7 Cummings and Garland dealt with absolute bar-
Rep. Stratton); 128 Cong. Rec. S4943 (daily ed. May 12, 1978) (remarks of 
Sen. Hayakawa); id., at S4945 (remarks of Sen. Jepsen). 
5 128 Cong. Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. 
Whitehurst); id., at H4758 (remarks of Rep. Simon); id., at H4769 (re-
marks of Rep. Montgomery); id., at H4770 (remarks of Rep. Stratton). 
As Senator Stennis stated: 
"I thought of the proposition here where some youngster might have 
overlooked signing up or might have misunderstood it or had not been cor-
rectly informed, but he is not going to be penalized for that because he still 
has complete control of the situation. All he will have to do is just to com-
ply with the law, and that will automatically make him eligible so far as this 
prohibition or restriction is concerned." 128 Cong. Rec. S4945 (daily ed. 
May 12, 1982). 
6 As the Solicitor General points out, one construction of the statute that 
avoids a constitutional problem is to make aid contingent on registration in 
the manner, but not the time, required by any proclamation. See Proc-
lamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45248 (1980) ("Persons who are required 
to be registered shall comply with the registration procedures and other 
rules and regulations prescribed by the Director of Selective Service.") 
' All of the appellees in this case had failed to comply with the registra-
tion requirements when § 1113 was enacted. As to eighteen-year-olds 
who have entered the class of nonregistrants after August 9, 1982-thirty 
days before the enactment of§ 1113-the statute is clearly prospective; in-
• 
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riers to entry into certain professions for those who could not 
file the required loyalty oaths; no one who had served the 
Confederacy could possible comply, for his status was irre-
versible. By contrast, § 1113's requirements, far from irre-
versible, can be met readily by either timely or late filing. 
"Far from attaching to ... past and ineradicable actions," 
ineligibility for title IV benefits "is made to turn upon 
continuingly contemporaneous fact" which a student who 
wants public assistance can correct. Communist Party v. 
Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 87 (1962). 
B 
Even if the specificity element were deemed satisfied by 
§ 1113,__the statute would not necessarily implicate the Bill of 
Attainder Clause. The proscription against Bills of Attain-
der reaches only statutes that inflict punishment on the speci-
fied individual or group. In determining whether a statute 
inflicts punishment within the proscription against Bills of 
Attainder, our holdings recognize that the severity of a sanc-
tion is not determinative of its character as punishment. 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 616 and n. 9 (1960). 
That burdens are placed on citizens by federal authority does 
not make those burdens punishment. Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 470 (1977); United 
States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 8 Conversely, legislative intent to encourage 
compliance with the law does not establish that a statute is 
merely the legitimate regulation of conduct. Punishment is 
not limited solely to retribution for past events, but may in-
volve deprivations inflicted to deter future misconduct. 
eligibility for financial aid is merely a deprivation in addition to potential 
criminal liability for the failure to register for the draft. 
8 "The fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not 
make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may 
be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be en-
joyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such depriva-
tion." Ibid. 
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United States v. Brown, 381 U. S., at 458--459. It is thus 
apparent that, though the governing criteria for an attainder 
may be readily indicated, "each case has turned on its own 
highly particularized context." Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 
at 616. 
In deciding whether a statute inflicts forbidden punish-
ment, we have recognized three necessary inquiries: (1) 
whether the challenged statute falls within the historical 
meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, 
"viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens im-
posed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legisla-
tive purposes"; and (3) whether the legislative record 
"evinces a congressional intent to punish." Nixon, supra, at 
473, 475-476, 478. We conclude that under these criteria 
§ 1113 is not a punitive Bill of Attainder. 
1 
At common law, Bills of Attainder often imposed the death 
penalty; lesser punishments were imposed by bills of pains 
and penalties. The Constitution proscribes these lesser pen-
alties as well those imposing death. Cummings v. Missouri, 
4 Wall., at 323. Historically used in England in times of re-
bellion or "violent political excitements," ibid., bills of pains 
and penalties commonly imposed imprisonment, banishment, 
and the punitive confiscation of property. Nixon, supra, at 
474. In our own country, the list of punishments forbidden 
by the Bill of Attainder Clause has expanded to include legis-
lative bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific 
employments or professions. 9 
Section 1113 imposes none of the burdens historically asso-
ciated with punishment. As this Court held in Flemming v. 
9 See, e. g., United States v. Braum, supra, in which Communist Party 
members were barred from offices in labor unions; United States v. Lovett, 
SU'pra, in which the law in question cut off salaries to three named govern-
ment employees; Cummings v. Missouri, supra, in which a priest was dis-
qualified from practicing as a clergyman; and Ex parte Garland, supra, in 
which lawyers were barred from the practice of law. 
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Nestor, 363 U. S., at 617, "the sanction is the mere denial of a 
noncontractual governmental benefit. No affirmative dis-
ability or restraint is imposed," and Congress has inflicted 
"nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of imprison-
ment" or other disabilities historically associated with 
punishment. 10 
Congress did not even deprive appellees of title IV benefits 
permanently; appellees can become eligible for title IV aid at 
any time simply by registering late and thus "carry the keys 
of their prison in their own pockets." Shillitani v. United 
States, 384 U. S. 364, 368 (1966). A statute that leaves open 
perpetually the possibility of qualifying for aid does not fall 
within the historical meaning • of . forbidden legislative 
punishment. 
2 
Our inquiry does not end with a determination that § 1113 
does not"mnict unishment in its historical sense. T~ensure 
that the legislature has not created an impermissible penalty 
not previously held to be within the proscription against Bills \ 
of Attainder, we must determine whether the challenged 
statute can be reasona~ly said to further nonpunitive goals. tJ/, ~ 
Nixon, 433 U. S., at 475-476. 
10 Appellees argue that the underpinnings of Flemming have been re-
moved by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262 (1970), and Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332 (1976). Goldberg held only that public assist-
ance "benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to 
receive them," 397 U. S., at 262, and that Due Process affords qualified 
recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing to guard against errone-
ous termination. The Court stressed that "the crucial factor in this con-
text ... is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over 
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to 
live while he waits." Id., at 264 (emphasis in original). Mathews reached 
the same conclusion with respect to disability benefits. Even Flemming 
noted that the interest of a covered employee under the Social Security Act 
"fall[s] within the protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded 
by the Due Proc~ss Clause," 363 U. S., at 611, while holding that Con-
gress' disqualification of certain deportees from receipt of Social Security 
benefits was not an attainder, id., at 617. 
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The legislative history reflects that § 1113 represents the 
considered Congressional decision to further nonpunitive leg-
islative goals. Congress was well aware that more than half 
a million young men had failed to comply with the registra-
tion requirement. 11 The legislators emphasized that one of 
the primary purposes of § 1113 was to encourage those re-
quired to register to do so. 12 
Conditioning receip~" of title IV aid on registration is 
plainly a tational means to improve compliance with the reg-
~
istration requirement. Since the group of young men who 
must register for the draft overlaps in large part with the 
group of students who are eligible for title IV aid, 13 Congress 
reasonably concluded that § 1113 would be a strong tonic to 
many nonregistrants. 
Section 1113 also furthers a fair allocation of scarce federal 
resources by limiting title IV aid to those who are willing to 
meet their responsibilities to the United States by register-
ing with the Selective Service when required to do so. As 
one senator stated: 
"This amendment seeks not only to increase compliance 
with the registration requirement but also to insure the 
most fair and just usage of Federal education benefits. 
During these times of extreme budgetary constraints, 
times when even the most worthwhile programs are cut 
11 See, e. g. , 128 Cong. Rec. H4758 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of 
Rep. Solomon); 128 Cong. Rec. 84945 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of 
Sen. Jepsen). 
12 See 128 Cong. Rec. H4758 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. 
Solomon); id., at H4770 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); 128 Cong. Rec. 84943 
(daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); id. , at S4945 (re-
marks of Sen. Stennis); i bid. (remarks of Sen. Jepsen). 
13 The Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. § 453, requires certain 
males between the ages of 18 and 26 to register. Those who fail to regis-
ter, though required to do so, are a significant part of the class to which 
title IV assistance is otherwise offered. Title IV aid is available for a 
broad range of postsecondary educational programs at colleges, universi-
ties, and vocational schools. 20 U. S. C. § 1085(a); seen. 1, supra. 
~ 
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back drastically, this Government has every obligation 
to see that Federal dollars are spent in the most fair and 
prudent manner possible. . . . If students want to fur-
ther their education at the expense of their country, they 
cannot expect these benefits to be provided without ac-
cepting their fair share of the responsiblities to that 
Government. "14 
Certain aspects of the legislation belie the view that § 1113 
is a punitive measure. Section 1113 denies title IV benefits 
to innocent as well as willful nonregistrants. Yet punitive 
legislation ordinarily does not reach those whose failure to 
comply with the law is not willful. Thus, in stressing that 
the legislation would reach unintentional violators, 128 Cong. 
Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Solo-
mon); id., at H4759 (remarks of Rep. Simon); 128 Cong. Rec. 
S4945 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Stennis), pro-
ponents indicated that they intended to regulate all 
nonregistrants, rather than to single out intentional 
nonregistrants for punishment. In this same nonpunitive 
spirit, Congress also allowed all nonregistrants to qualify for 
title IV aid simply by registering late, instead of choosing to 
punish willful nonregistrants by denying them benefits even 
if they registered belatedly. 
We see therefore that the legislative history provides con-
vincing support for the view that, in enacting § 1113, Con-
gress sought, not to punish anyone, 15 but to promote compli-
1• 128 Cong. Rec. S4943-4944 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. 
Hayakawa); see also id., at S4943 (remarks of Sen. Mattingly); 128 Cong. 
Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Montgomery). 
1
• Applying the third part of the Nixon test, the District Court concluded 
that§ 1113 is a punitive measure. But the District Court relied in part on 
the statements of legislators who opposed the statute because they thought 
the statute punished nonregistrants. 128 Cong. Rec. H4760 (daily ed. 
July 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Edgar); id., at H4761 (remarks of Rep. 
Goldwater); 128 Cong. Rec. S4944 (daily ed. May 12, 1982) (remarks of 
Sen. Durenburger). These statements are entitled to little, if any, 
weight, since they were made by opponents of the legislation. 
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ance with the draft registration requirement and fairness in 
the allocation of scarce federal resources. Section 1113 
clearly furthers nonpunitive legislative goals. 
C 
Because § 1113 does not single out an identifiable group 
that would be ineligible for title IV aid or inflict punishment 
within the meaning of Bill of Attainder Clause, we hold that 
the District Court erred in striking down § 1113 as an imper-
missible attainder. 
III 
Appellees assert that§ 1113 violates the Fifth Amendment 
by compelling nonregistrants to acknowledge that they have 
failed to register timely when confronted with certifying to 
their schools that they have complied with the registration 
law. Pointing to the fact that the willful failure to register 
within the time fixed by Proclamation No. 4771 is a criminal 
offense punishable under 50 U. S. C. § 462, they contend that 
§ 1113 requires them-since in fact they have not regis-
tered__..:._to confess to a criminal act and that this is "compul-
sion" in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights. 
However, a person who has not registered clearly is under 
no compulsion to seek financial aid; if he has not registered, 
he is simply ineligible for aid. Since a non-registrant is 
bound to know that his application for federal aid would be 
denied, he is in no sense under any "compulsion" to seek that 
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394--395 
(1951). 
The District Court also relied on several isolated statements expressing 
understandable indignation over the decision of some nonregistrants to 
show their defiance of the law. See 128 Cong. Rec. H4757 (daily ed. July 
28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Montgomery); 128 Cong. Rec. S4944 (daily ed. 
May 12, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa). But such statements do not 
constitute "the unmistakable evidence of punitive intent which .. . is re-
quired before a Congressional enactment of this kind may be struck down." 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. , at 619. 
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aid. An applicant, ineligible for aid, has no reason to make 
any statement to anyone as to whether or not he has 
registered. 
If appellees were to register late, they could, of course, ob-
tain Title IV aid without providing any information to their 
school that would incriminate them, since the statement to 
the school by the applicant is simply that he is in compliance 
with the registration law; it does not require him to disclose 
whether he was a timely or a late registrant. See n. 2, 
supra. A late registrant is therefore not required to disclose 
any incriminating information in order to become eligible for 
aid. 
Although an applicant who registers late nee~ not disclose 
that fact in his application for financial aid, the Government 
concedes that a late registrant must disclose that his action is 
untimely when he registers with the Selective Service; the 
draft registration card must be dated and contain the regis-
trant's date of birth. 32 CFR § 1615.4 (1983). This raises 
the question whether§ 1113 violates appellees' Fifth Amend-
ment rights because they must register late in order to get 
aid and thus reveal to the Selective Service the failure to 
comply timely with the registration law. Appellees contend 
that, under our holding in Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 
83-84 (1973), the very risk that they will be ineligible for fi-
nancial aid constitutes "compulsion" within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment. We reject this contention. 
In Turley we held that "[t]he plaintiffs' [architects'] dis-
qualification from public contrat ting for five years as a pen-
alty for asserting a constitutional privilege is violative of 
their Fifth Amendment rights." Id., at 83. However, our 
holding in Turley does not govern this case. N onregistrants 
such as appellees are not in the same position as potential 
public contractors in Turley. An 18-year-old male who 
refuses to register is, of course, subject to prosecution for 
failure to register, but he is not compelled by law to acknowl-
edge his failure to comply. Only when he registers-includ-
. . 
83-276-0PINION 
16 SELECTIVE SERVICE v. MINN. PUB. INT. RES. GP. 
ing a late registration-will he be asked to state his date of 
birth and thus acknowledge that he did not timely register. 
None of these appellees has registered and thus none of 
them has been confronted with a need to assert a Fifth 
Amendment privilege when asked to disclose his date of 
birth. Unlike the architects in Turley, these appellees have 
not been denied the opportunity to register and in no sense 
have they been disqualified for financial aid "for asserting a 
constitutional privilege." Ibid. Appellees' position is there-
fore clearly distinguishable from that of the contractors in 
Turley. 
It is well settled that, "in the ordinary case, if a witness 
under compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of 
claiming the privilege, the government has not 'compelled' 
him to incriminate himself," Minnesota v. Murphy, --
U. S. --, -- (1984); "[a]nswers may be compelled regard-
less of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and 
state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connec-
tion with a criminal prosecution against the person testify-
ing," Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273 (1968). However, 
these appellees, not having sought to register, have had no 
occasion to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege when 
asked to state their dates of birth; the Government has not 
refused any request for immunity for their answers or other-
wise threatened them with penalties for invoking the privi-
lege as in Turley. Under these circumstances, appellees will 
not be heard to complain that § 1113 violates their Fifth 
Amendment rights by forcing them to acknowledge during 
the registration process they have avoided that they have 
registered late. 16 
1
• Appellees also assert that § 1113 violates equal protection because it 
discriminates against less wealthy nonregistrants. That argument is 
meritless. Section 1113 treats all nonregistrants alike, denying aid to both 
the poor and the wealthy. But even if the statute discriminated against 
poor nonregistrants because more wealthy nonregistrants could continue 
to pay for their postsecondary educations, the statute must be sustained if 
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IV 
We conclude .that § 1113 does not violate the proscription 
against Bills of Attainder. Nor have appellees raised a cog-
nizable claim under the Fifth Amendment. 
The judgment of the District Court is 
Reversed 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Harris v. McRae, 
448 U. S. 297, 322-324 (1980). That standard is easily met here, because 
§ 1113 is rationally related to the legitimate government objectives of en-
couraging registration and fairly allocating scarce federal resources. See 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-276 
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM ET AL. v. MINNESOTA 
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH 
GROUP ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
[May -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the CHIEF JUSTICE'S opinion, and write only to ex-
press a deeply held personal opinion. When young men obli-
gated to register under the Selective Service Act honestly 
have conscientious convictions that it is morally wrong to de-
fend by force of arms one's family, country and the liberty we 
enjoy, I respect-without understanding-such convictions.' 
Absent this justification, I can conceive of no valid reason 
why appellees should expect to receive special benefits from 
our government-benefits in the end that are paid for by fel-
low citizens who recognize their duty to defend the precious 
liberties prior generations have fought to provide and 
preserve. 2 
1 For two or three years following World War II, I served in Virginia as 
a Hearing Officer, designated by the Attorney General of the United 
States to hear and make recommendations on claims of conscientious objec-
tors to military service. In a number of cases, I made decisions favorable 
to the objectors on the basis of testimony as to the sincerity of convictions 
that the use of force to kill under any circumstances is immoral. 
2 Young men in the United States are required only to register for mili• 
tary service when most of the other major countries of the world require 
this service. In NATO, for example, the following countries have compul-
sory military service: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, West Germany, and Turkey. Switzer-
land also has compulsory training, as do all the communist countries. See 
""'_ ,.___ .,. 
. . 
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The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
1983-1984 (1983). 
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THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
[May-, 1984) 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the CHIEF JUSTICE's opinjon, and write only to ex-
press a deeply held personal opinion. When young men obli-
gated to register under the Selective Service Act hone&tly 
have conscientious convictions that it is morally wrong to de-
fend by force of arms one's family, country and the liberty we 
enjoy, I respect-without understanding-such convictions. 1 
Absent this justification, I can conceive of no valid reason 
why appellees should expect to receive special benefits from 
our government-benefits in the end that are paid for by fel-
low citizens who recognize their duty to defend the precious 
liberties prior generations have fought to provide and 
preserve. 2 
'For two or three years following World War II, I served in Virginia as 
a Hearing Officer, designated by the Attorney General of the United 
States to hear and make recommendations on claims of conscientious objec-
tors to military service. In a number of cases, I made decisions favorable 
to the objectors on the basis of testimony as to the sincerity of convictions 
that the use of force to kill under any circumstances is immoral. 
2 Young men in the United States are required only to register for mili-
tary service when most of the other major countries of the world require 
this service. In NATO, for example, the following countries have compul-
sory military service: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, West Germany, and Turkey. Switzer-
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The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
1983-1984 (1983). 
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May 26, 1984 
83-276 Selective Service System v. Minnesota 
Dear Chief: m 
I am writing you a separate join note in this 
case. I do suggest that you consider adding a footnote 
along the following lines: 
"Young men in the United States are re-
quired only to register for military service 
when most of the other maior countries of the 
world require this service. In NATO, for 
example, the following countries have compul-
sory military service: Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey and West Germany. 
Switzerland also has compulsory service as do 
- of course - all the communist countries. 
See, The International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies, The Military Balance 1983-1984 
(1983)." 
I have the copy of the Military Balance if you or 
your clerk wish to see it. The library obtained it for me. 
It is possible that I may write a very brief con-
currence. If so, I will circulate it early next week so you 
will not be held up. 






TO: Rob DATE: May 29, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-27, Selective Service 
I still have questions about the Chief's 
opinion, and would like your thinking. 
1. Bills of attainder. Appellees should have 
registered before September 1, 1982. In 1983, Congress 
passed the law that makes persons who violated the 
Selective Service Act ineligible for federal aid under the 
Higher Education Act. The DC held that the Act of 1983 
"singles out an ascertainable group based on past conduct" 
and denies them a federal privilege. This, the DC says, 
constituted a bill of attainder. The Chief's opinion 
devotes 9 pages to showing that the DC was wrong. 
My knowledge of bills of attainder is limited, 
but I have serious doubts as to whether it has any 
application at all in a situation like this. I cite a 
couple of examples, and ask your opinion of them: 
(a) Congress enacts a law requiring applicants 
for federal aid of any kind (e.g., loans to small business 
persons or grants to do research), providing that 
- - 2. 
applicants must certify that they have filed income tax 
returns for each of the past three years. This also, 
under the DC rule, would be a bill of attainder. I can't 
believe it. 
(b) After reading my dissent in Sure-Tan, 
Congress passes a law amending the NLRA to provide that no 
backpay shall be paid to illegal aliens in the situation 
involved in Sure-Tan? 
Fundamentally, I have understood that bills of 
attainder applied to "punishment". The only punishment -
in any normal sense of that term - that may be involved in 
this case is for a er ime previously committed. Is there 
any law to the effect that withholding a benefit 
constitutes punishment? 
The Chief in Part B (p. 9-14) does address - at 
great length - the "punishment" issue. Much of what he 
says makes a lot of sense, but is it necessary to take 
appellees' arguments seriously to the extent of answering 
them at such boring length. In Subpart 2 of Part B (p. 
11), the Chief argues there was no punitive purpose or 
goal. I certainly agree with this, but he seems to apply 
a "rational basis" standard for this conclusion. See p. 
- - 3. 
12. In my view, the government has a compelling interest 
to encourage registration. 
2. Fifth Amendment. This is the part of the 
opinion the Chief has rewritten. Again, he seems 
unnecessarily concerned about appellees' argument. Why 
isn't the short answer, as the Chief finally says at the 
bottom of page 15, there is no compulsion to apply for a 
federal loan. If one does apply, he has voluntarily 
"incriminated himself" to the extent this may occur. I 
have not read Turley recently, but under my recollection 
of it Turley is irrelevant. 
* * * 
It seems to me that the Chief's opinion misses 
the opportunity to emphasize the compelling interest of 
the United States and its citizens to provide for the 
national defense. The Constitution requires as much. 
Denying benefits to violators of our er iminal laws would 
seem to be an elementary right of a government. 
I would like to write brief, addressing the 
legal issues - but doing so far more summarily than the 
Chief. At least, give this some thought and we can do 
some talking. 
- - 4. 
sentences. 
Take a look at n. 3, p. 5, the last two 
Congress certainly has provided a jury trial 
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Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
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Re: 83-276 - Selective Service System v. 
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group 
Dear Chief: 
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P.S. I'd put it in as follows - essentially your version. 
Young men in the United States are required only to 
register for military service when most of the other 
major countries of the world require actual service. 
Most of our European Allies in NATO, for example, 
have compulsory military service: Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey and West Germany. 
Switzerland also has compulsory service as do - of 
course - all the communist countries. See, The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
Military Balance 1983-1984 (1983). 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
-
;%,u.prttttt Qj:ourt u-f tq~ ~ttiub .;§itarea-
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Re: No. 83-276 - Selective Service Sys tem 
May ·3o, 1984 
v. Minnesota Public Int . Research GrouE 
Dear Chief: 
Although I listened to the oral argumen t in this case, 
I shall recuse myself. At the end of your opinion, there-
fore, will you please add: "JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in 
the decision of this case." 
The Chief Justice 






lfp/ss 05/30/84 ROBSYS SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Rob DATE: May 30, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-276 Selective Service System v. Minnesota 
Here is a rough draft, written in summary and 
conclusory terms, of what I have in mind. I have not fol-
lowed your draft verbatim, but it is always helpful for me 
to have something to start with. 
I 
I would like to add some footnotes, including the 
following: 
(i) At the end of the opinion, where I speak of 
reversing the DC, add a note saying that I agree with and 
join Part III of the Court's opinion rejecting appellees' 
claim of a denial of due process. This is a meritless 
claim: 
' (ii) Add a note that briefly disttnguishes the 
principal cases relied upon by appellees, and particularly 
Nixon and Cummings: and 
(iii) Add the note on compulsory military service 
that the Chief prefers not to use (see his letter to me). I 
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June 26, 1984 
No. 83-276 
Selective Service System, et al. 
v. Minnesota Public Interest 
Research Group, et al. 
Dear Chief, 
I note you have listed the above 
for announcement on Friday. Perhaps I 
didn't make it as clear as I should have 
at this morning's Conference, but I'm 
not completely at rest in that case and 
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Selective Service System v. Minnesota PIRG 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am sending the following down to the printer in this case. 
"JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
For the reasons stated in Part II of- JUSTICE MARSHALL'S 
dissenting opinion, I too would affirm the judgment of the 
District Court on the ground that §1113 of the Department of 
Defense Authorization Act of 1983 compels students seeking 
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
May 29, 1984 
~ 
83-27t Selective Service 
I still have questions about the Chief's 
opinion, and would like your thinking. 
1. Bills of attainder. Appellees should have 
registered before September 1, 1982. In 1983, Congress 
passed the law that makes persons who violated the 
Selective Service Act ineligible for federal aid under the 
Higher Education Act. The DC held that the Act of 1983 
"singles out an ascertainable group based on past conduct" 
and denies them a federal privilege. This, the DC says, 
constituted a bill of attainder. The Chief's opinion 
devotes 9 pages to showing that the DC was wrong. 
My knowledge of bills of attainder is limited, 
but I have serious doubts as to whether it has any 
application at all in a situation like this. 
couple of examples, and ask your opinion of them: 
I cite a 
(a) Congress enacts a law requiring applicants 
for federal aid of any kind (e.g., loans to small business 
persons or grants to do research), providing that 
2. 
applicants must certify that they have filed income tax 
returns for each of the past three years. This also, 
under the DC rule, would be a bill of attainder. I can't 
believe it. 
(b) After reading my dissent in Sure-Tan, 
Congress passes a law amending the NLRA to provide that no 
backpay shall be paid to illegal aliens in the situation 
involved in Sure-Tan? 
Fundamentally, I have understood that bills of 
attainder applied to "punishment". The only punishment -
in any normal sense of that term - that may be involved in 
this case is for a er ime previously committed. Is there 
any law to the effect that withholding a benefit 
constitutes punishment? 
The Chief in Part B (p. 9-14) does address - at 
great length - the "punishment" issue. Much of what he 
says makes a lot of sense, but is it necessary to take 
appellees' arguments seriously to the extent of answering 
them at such boring length. In Subpart 2 of Part B (p. 
11), the Chief argues there was no punitive purpose or 
goal. I certainly agree with this, but he seems to apply 
a "rational basis" standard for this conclusion. Seep. 
3. 
12. In my view, the government has a compelling interest 
to encourage registration. 
2. Fifth Amendment. This is the part of the 
opinion the Chief has rewritten. Again, he seems 
unnecessarily concerned about appellees' argument. Why 
isn't the short answer, as the Chief finally says at the 
bottom of page 15, there is no compulsion to apply for a 
federal loan. If one does apply, he has voluntarily 
"incriminated himself" to the extent this may occur. I 
have not read Turley recently, but under my recollection 
of it Turley is irrelevant. 
* * * 
It seems to me that the Chief's opinion misses 
the opportunity to emphasize the compelling interest of 
the United States and its citizens to provide for the 
national defense. The Constitution requires as much. 
Denying benefits to violators of our criminal laws would 
seem to be an elementary right of a government. 
I would like to 
legal issues - but doing so 
write brief½, addressing 
far more summarily than 
the 
the 




Take a look at n. 3, p. 5, the last two 
Congress certainly has provided a jury trial 




lfp/ss 05/30/84 ROBSYS SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Rob DATE: May 30, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-276 Selective Service System v. Minnesota 
Here is a rough draft, written in summary and 
conclusory terms, of what I have in mind. I have not fol-
lowed your draft verbatim, but it is always helpful for me 
to have something to start with. 
I would like to add some footnotes, including the 
following: 
(i) At the end of opinion, where I speak of 
saying that I agree with and reversing the DC, add 
join Part III of the opinion rejecting appellees' 
claim of a denial of due process. This is a meritless 
claim; 
(ii) Add a note that briefly distinguishes the 
principal cases relied upon by appellees, and particularly 
Nixon and Cummings; and 
(iii) Add the note on compulsory military service 
that the Chief prefers not to use (see his letter to me). I 
may add a sentence or two to my quotation from John Jay. 
ss 
------
L. F. P., Jr. 
_/ 
lfp/ss 05/30/84 Rider A, p. 3 (Service) 
SER3 SALLY-POW 
The essays arguing in favor of adoption of the 
Constitution that are known the Federalist Papers are 
replete with emphasis on the need for a national 
government to provide for defense by raising and 
maintaining armed forces. In John Jay's prescient Paper, 
he observed 
See also Hamilton's Paper No. 25 in which he spoke against 
"expos[ing] our property and liberty to the mercy of 
foreign invaders and invite them by our weakness [to 
attack our country] ••• might endanger that liberty by 
2. 
an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation". 
Opponents of a national union argued against "the raising 
of armies in time of peace". Responding to this argument, 
Hamilton answered that the "United States would then 
exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world 
has yet seen - that of a national incapacitated by its 
constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually 
invaded". 
(Rob: In order for you to check these cites I will give 
you my little paperback Federalist Papers. The quote from 
Jay is on p. 46 and the quotes from Hamilton are on pp. 
165 and 166.) 
3. 
I may end this little opinion as follows: 
As I find that §1113 is punitive neither its 
purpose of effect, it is unnecessary in my view to reach 
the other arguments addressed by the Court on this issue. 
I add, however, that I do not disagree with the Court's 
reasoning, except to the extent it relies upon the 
Secretary's regulation that "interprets" the 1983 Act. In 
view of the compelling interest of the government, the 
constitutionality of §1113 does not depend upon this 
interpretation. 
In sum, I join sections 1, 3 and 4 of the 
Court's opinion, and its judgment. 
., 
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83-276 Selective Service System v. Minnesota 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I certainly do not disagree with the holding or, 
indeed, with most of the Court's opinion. I write to say, 
as I view the issue presented, that much of the opinion is 
unnecessary. 
Unless §1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 
1983 is punitive in its purpose and effect, there is no 
bill of attainder. The term punitive connotes punishment 
as for a er ime. Young men who knowingly have failed to 
comply with the registration requirements of the Selective 
Service Act have indeed committed a er ime for which the 
Act itself provides the only punishment. Section 1113 is 
in no sense punitive; it authorizes no punishment in any 
.. 
2. 
normal or general acceptance of that familiar term. 
Rather, it provides a benefit at the expense of taxpayers 
generally for those who request and qualify for it. There 
is no compulsion to request the benefit. No mi nor i ty or 
disfavored group is singled out by Congress for disparate 
treatment. Section 1113 applies broadly and equally to 
every male citizen and resident alien upon attaining 18 
years of age to register. As its legislative history 
makes perfectly clear it was enacted to encourage 
compliance with the Selective Service Act, leaving 
punishment for failure to comply entirely to the 
provisions of the Act itself and to the normal enforcement 
provisions provided by law. The Court observes that 
requiring compliance with the registration requirement is 
a "rational means" to encourage compliance with law. It 
3. 
is encouragement only; not compulsion. Moreover, the 
interests of the government - indeed of the people of our 
country in providing for national security is a 
compelling interest. It has been r ecognized as such from 
the earliest days of the Republic. The Preamble of the 
Constitution declares that one of its purposes is to 
"provide for the common defense 111 
For these reasons alone, and without reliance 
1Recently, in thumbing through the 
Federalist Papers, I noticed John Jay's prescient paper 
"No. 4", in which hews addressing the need for a federal 
union to supplant the loose confederation of states. 
National defense, as the Preamble to our Constitution 
states, was a primary reason for the union. Jay observed 
that the "safety of the people of American against dangers 
from foreign forces depends not on l y on [our] forebearing 
to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on 
their placing and continuing themselves in such a 
situation as not to invite hostility ... It is too true, 
however, disgraceful it may be to human nature, that 
nations in general will make war whenever they have a 
prospect of getting anything by it; [and] absolute 
monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get 
nothing by it . . • " 
4. 
upon the Secretary's regulation "interpreting" the 1983 
Act, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court. 
1Hf 
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83-276 Selective Service System v. Minnesota 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I do not disagree with the holding or, indeed, 
with most of the Court's opinion. As I view the issue 
presented, much of the opinion is unnecessary. 
Unless §1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 
1983 is punitive in its purpose and effect, there is no 
Bill of Attainder. The term punitive connotes punishment 
as for a er ime. Young men who knowingly have failed to 
comply with the registration requirements of the Selective 
Service Act have committed a crime for which the Act 
itself provides the only punishment. 1 Section 1113 is in 
1Rob: Cite punishment provisions. 
2. 
no sense punitive; it authorizes no punishment in any 
normal or general acceptance of that familiar term. 
Rather, it provides a benefit at the expense of taxpayers 
generally for those who request and qualify for it. There 
is no compulsion to request the benefit. No minority or 
disfavored group is singled out by Congress for disparate 
treatment. 
Section 1113 applies broadly and equally to 
every male citizen and resident alien upon attaining 18 
years of age, requiring only registration. 2 As its 
legislative history makes clear it was enacted to 
encourage compliance with the Selective Service Act, 
leaving punishment for failure to comply entirely to the 
2Rob: Add the note on other countries. 
3. 
provisions of the Act itself and to the normal enforcement 
provisions provided by law. The Court observes that 
Congress by §1113 has adapteda "rational means" to 
encourage compliance with law. (Ante, at 12) . It is 
encouragement only; not compulsion. Moreover, the 
interest of government - indeed of the people of our 
country in providing for national security is 
compelling. It has been recognized as such from the 
earliest days of the Republic. 3 The Preamble of the 
Constitution declares that one of its purposes is to 
"provide for the common defense" 4 
3Art. I, §8, of the Constitution expressly 
empowers Congress, in a single clause, "to pay the Debts 
and provide for the Common Defense and General Welfare of 
the United4States." The essays arguing in favor of adoption of 
the Constitution that are known the Federalist Papers are 
replete with emphasis on the need for a national 
government to provide for defense by raising and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
As I find that §1113 is punitive neither its 
purpose of effect, it is unnecessary in my view to reach 
the other arguments addressed by the Court on the Bill of 
Attainder issue. I add, however, that I do not disagree 
with the Court's reasoning, except to the extent it relies 
upon the Secretary's regulation that "interprets" the 1983 
maintaining armed forces. In John Jay's prescient Paper, 
No. 4, he observed that the "safety of the people of 
American against dangers from foreign forces depends not 
only on [our] forebearing to give just causes of war to 
other nations, but also on their placing and continuing 
themselves in such a situation as not to invite hostility 
. It is too true, however, disgraceful it may be to 
human nature, that nations in general will make war 
whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; 
[and] absolute monarchs will often make war when their 
nations are to get nothing by it ... " 
See also Hamilton's Papers No. 24 and 25. 
Opponents of a national union were arguing against "the 
raising of armies in time of peace". Responding to this 
argument, Hamilton answered that the "United States would 
then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the 
world has yet seen - that of a nation incapacitated by its 
constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually 
invaded". Hami 1 ton also spoke of the danger of 
"expos[ing] our property and liberty to the mercy of 
foreign invaders and invit[ing] them by our weakness [to 
attack our country] • 
5. 
Act. In view of the compelling interest of government, 
the constitutionality of §1113 does not depend upon this 
interpretation. 
In sum, I join sections I, III and IV of the 
Court's opinion, and its judgment. 
~ (,,t/ 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I eerti ~Y do not disagree with the holding or, 
indeed, with most of the Court's opinion. ~
As I view the issue presented, ( t;;J;..t much of the opinion is 
unnecessary. 
Unless §1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 
1983 is EUnitive in its purpose and effect, there is no 
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Act itself provides the only punishment. Section 1113 is 
in no sense punitive; it authorizes no punishment in any 
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~ for those who request and qualify for it. There 
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Selective Service System v. Minnesota 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I do not disagree with the holding or, indeed, 
with most of the Court's opinion. As I view the issue 
presented, much of the opinion is unnecessary. 
Unless §1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 
1983 is punitive in its purpose and effect, there is no 
Bill of Attainder. Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services, 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977). The term "punitive" 
connotes punishment as for a crime. Young men who 
knowingly have failed to comply with the registration 
requirements of the Selective Service Act have committed a 
crime for which the Act itself provides the only 
punishment. 1 Section 1113 is in no sense punitive; it 
1section 12 of the Military Selective 
Service Act provides, in relevant part: 
Footnote continued on next page. 
\ 2. 
authorizes no punishment in any normal or general 
acceptance of that familiar term. Rather, it provides a 
benefit at the expense of taxpayers generally for those 
who request and qualify for it. There is no compulsion to 
request the benefit. No minority or disfavored group is 
singled out by Congress for disparate treatment. 
Section 1113 applies broadly and equally to 
every male citizen and resident alien who upon attaining 
18 years of age is required by Presidential order to 
register with the Selective Service. 2 As its legislative 
"[A] ny person who • • • evades or refuses 
registration or service in the armed forces or 
any of the requirements of this title ••• or who 
in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or 
refuse to perform any duty required of him under 
or in the execution of this title, ••• or rules, 
regulations, or directions made pursuant to this 
title ••• shall, upon conviction in any district 
court of the United States of competent 
jurisdicton, be punished by imprisonment for not 
more than five years or a fine of not more than 
$10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment 
.... " 50 U.S.C. App. §462. 
2Young men in the United States are required 
only to register for military service when most of the 
other major countries of the world require this service. 
In NATO, for example, the following countries have 
compulsory military service: Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
history makes clear, §1113 was enacted to encourage 
compliance with the Selective Service Act, leaving 
punishment for failure to comply entirely to the 
provisions of the Act itself and to the normal enforcement 
provisions provided by law. The Court observes that 
Congress by Slll3 has adopted a •rational means" to 
encourage compliance with law. Ante, at 12. It is 
encouragement only; not compulsion. Moreover, the 
interest of government - indeed of the people of our 
country 
compelling. 
in providing for national security is 
It has been recognized as such from the 
earliest days of the Republic. 3 The Preamble of the 
Turkey and West Germany. Switzerland also has compulsory 
service as do--of course--all the communist countries. 
See, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
The Milita3y Balance 1983-1984 (1983) ." The Federalist Papers, the essays arguing 
in favor of adoption of the Constitution, are replete with 
emphasis on the need for a national government to provide 
for defense by raising and maintaining armed forces. In 
John Jay's prescient Paper, No. 4, he observed that the 
"safety of the people of American against dangers from 
foreign forces depends not only on [our] forebearing to 
give just causes of war to other nations, but also on 
their placing and continuing themselves in such a 
situation as not to invite hostility ••• It is too true, 
however, disgraceful it may be to human nature, that 
nations in general will make war whenever they have a 
prospect of getting anything by it; [and] absolute 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Cons ti tut ion declares that one of the Framers' 
was to "provide for the common defence." 4 
4. 
purposes 
As I find that §1113 is punitive neither in its 
purpose or effect, it is unnecessary in my view to reach 
the other arguments addressed by the Court on the Bill of 
Attainder issue. 5 I add, however, that I do not disagree 
monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get 
nothing by it •••• " The Federalist No. 4, at pp. 18-19 
(J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original) • 
Many of the opponents of the national union 
argued against "the raising of armies in time of peace". 
Responding to this argument, Alexander Hamilton answered 
that the "United States would then exhibit the most 
extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen -
that of a nation incapacitated by its cons ti tut ion to 
prepare for defense before it was actually invaded". The 
Federalist No. 25, p. 161 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton 
also spoke of the danger of "expos[ing] our property and 
liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders and invi t [ing] 
them by our weakness [to attack our country]." Ibid; see 
also The Ffderalist No. 24 (A. Hamilton). 
Art. I, §8, of the Constitution expressly 
empowers Congress, in a single clause, "to pay the Debts 
and provide for the Common Defense and General Welfare of 
the Uniteg States." 
In support of their contention that Slll3 is a 
form of punishment, appellees cite Ex Parte Garland, 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867), Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 
( 4 Wall.) 277 (186 7) , and United States v. Lovett, 328 
u. S. 303 (1946). In each of these cases, the Court held 
that "'a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion' from a 
chosen vocation" was "punishment" for purposes of the Bill 
of Attainder Clause. Id., at 316. Those cases are 
inapposi te here. Section 1113 does not restrict in any 
way appellees' choice of vocations or otherwise restrict 
Footnote continued on next page. 
" s. 
with the Court's reasoning, except to the extent it relies 
upon the Secretary's regulation that "interprets" the 1983 
Act. In view of the compelling interest of government, 
the constitutionality of §1113 does not depend upon this 
interpretation. 
In sum, I join sections I, II B, III and IV of 
the Court's opinion, and its judgment. 
the exercise of any constitutional right. It merely 
provides that those men who wish to receive title IV aid 
must first comply with the registration laws. 
. ~ ,_ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-276 
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM ET AL. v. MINNESOTA 
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
[June -, 1984) 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I do not disagree with the holding or, indeed, with most of 
the Court's opinion. As I view the issue presented, much of 
the opinion is unnecessary. 
Unless § 1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1983 is 
punitive in its purpose and effect, there is no Bill of Attain-
der. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 
425, 472 (1977). The term ''punitive" connotes punishment 
as for a crime. Young men who knowingly have failed to 
comply with the registration requirements of the Selective 
Service Act have committed a crime for which the Act itself 
provides the only punishment. 1 Section 1113 is in no sense 
punitive; it authorizes no punishment in any normal or gen-
eral acceptance of that familiar term. Rather, it provides a 
1 Section 12 of the Military Selective Service Act provides, in relevant 
part: 
"[A)ny person who . . . evades or refuses registration or service in the 
armed forces or any of the requirements of this title . . . or who in any 
manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any duty re-
quired of him under or in the execution of this title, ... or rules, regula-
tions, or directions made pursuant to this title ... shall, upon conviction in 
any district court of the United States of competent jurisdicton, be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more 
than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment .. . . " 50 U. S. C. 
App. §462. 
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benefit at the expense of taxpayers generally for those who 
request and qualify for it. There is no compulsion to request 
the benefit. No minority or disfavored group is singled out 
by Congress for disparate treatment: 
Section 1113 applies broadly and equally to every male citi-
zen and resident alien who upon attaining 18 years of age is 
required by Presidential order to register with the Selective 
Service.2 As its legislative history makes clear, § 1113 was 
enacted to encourage compliance with the Selective Service 
Act, leaving punishment for failure to comply entirely to the 
provisions of the Act itself and to the normal enforcement 
provisions provided by law. The Court observes that Con-
gress by§ 1113 has adopted a "rational means" to encourage 
compliance with law. Ante, at 12. It is encouragement 
only; not compulsion. Moreover, the interest of govern-
ment--,indeed of the people of our country-in providing for 
national security is compelling. It has been reco~ed as 
such from the earliest days of the Republic. 3 The Preamble 
1 Young men in the United States are required only to register for mili-
tary service when most of the other major countries of the world require 
this service. In NATO,· for example, the following countries have compul-
sory military service: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and West Germany. Switzerland 
also has compulsory service as do-of course--all the communist countries. 
See, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Bal-
ance 1983-1984 (1983)." 
1 The Federalist Papers, the essays arguing in favor of adoption of the 
Constitution, are replete with emphasis on the need for a national govern-
ment to provide for defense by raising and maintaining armed forces. In 
John Jay's prescient Paper, No. 4, he observed that the "safety of the peo-
ple of American against dangers from foreign forces depends not only on 
[our] forebearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on 
their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invi.te 
hostility. . . It is too true, however, disgraceful it may be to human na-
ture, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect 
of getting anything by it; [and] absolute monarchs will often make war 
when their nations are to get nothing by it .... " The Federalist No. 4, at 
pp. 18-19 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). 
' 
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of the Constitution declares that one of the Framers' pur-
poses was to "provide for the common defence."• 
As I find that § 1113 is punitive neither in its purpose or 
effect, it ~ unnecessary in my view to reach the other argu-
ments addressed by the Court on the Bill of Attainder issue. 6 
I add, however, that I do not disagree with the Court's rea-
soning, except to the extent it relies upon the Secretary's 
regulation that "interprets" the 1983 Act. In view of the 
compelling interest of government, the constitutionality of 
§ 1113 does not depend upon this interpretation. 
In sum, I join sections I, II B, III and IV of the Court's 
opinion, and its judgment. 
Many of the opponents of the national union argued against "the raising 
of annies in time of peace." Responding to this argument, Alexander 
Hamilton answered that the "United States would then exhibit the most 
extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen-that of a nation in-
capacitated by its constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually 
invaded." The Federalist No. 25, p. 161 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton 
also spoke of the danger of "expos[ing] our property and liberty to the 
mercy of foreign invaders and invit[ing] them by our weakness [to attack 
our country]." Ibid; see also The Federalist No. 24 (A. Hamilton). 
• Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress, in a sin-
gle clause, "to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defense and 
General Welfare of the United States." 
'In support of their contention that § 1113 is a form of punishment, ap-
pellees cite Ex Parle Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867), Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), and Uniwi St,a,~s v. Lovett, 328 
U. S. 303 (1946). In each of these cases, the Court held that" 'a legislative 
decree of perpetual exclusion' from a chosen vocation" was ''punishment" 
for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id., at 316. Those cases are 
inapposite here. Section 1113 does not restrict in any way appellees' 
choice of vocations or otherwise restrict the exercise of any constitutional 
right. It merely provides that those men who wish to receive title IV aid 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. ~276 
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM ET AL. v. MINNESOTA 
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
•[June-, 1984) 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I do not disagree with the holding or, indeed, with most of l 
the Court's opinion. As I view this case, however, the Bill of 
Attainder issue can and should be disposed of solely on the . 
ground that § 1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1983 
is not punitive legislation. 
Unless § 1113 is punitive in its purpose and effect, there is 
no Bill of Attainder. Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services, 433 U. S. 425, 472 (1977). The term "punitive" 
connotes punishment as for a crime. Young men who know-
ingly have failed to comply with the registration require-
ments of the Selective Service Act have committed a crime 
for which the Act itself provides the only punishment. 1 Sec-
tion 1113 is in no sense punitive; it authorizes no punishment 
1 Section 12 of the Military Selective Service Act provides, in relevant 
part: 
"[A]ny person who . . . evades or refuses registration or service in the 
armed forces or any of the requirements of this title . . . or who in any 
manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any duty re-
quired of him under or in the execution of this title, . .. or rules, regula-
tions, or directions made pursuant to this title ... shall, upon conviction in 
any district court of the United States of competent jurisdicton, be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more 
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in any normal or general acceptance of that familiar term. 
Rather, it provides a benefit at the expense of taxpayers gen-
erally for those who request and qualify for it. There is no 
compulsion to request the benefit. No minority or disfa-
vored group is singled out by Congress for disparate 
treatment. 
Section 1113 applies broadly and equally to every male citi-
zen and resident alien who upon attaining 18 years of age is 
required by Presidential order to register with the Selective 
Service. 2 As its legislative history makes clear, § 1113 was 
enacted to encourage compliance with the Selective Service 
Act, leaving punishment for failure to comply entirely to the 
provisions of the Act itself and to the normal enforcement 
provisions provided by law. The Court observes that Con-
gress by§ 1113 has adopted a "rational means" to encourage 
complian<;:e with law. Ante, at 12. It is encouragement 
only; not compulsion. Moreover, the interest of govern-
ment-indeed of the people of our country-in providing for 
national security is compelling. It has been recognized as 
such from the earliest days of the Republic. 3 The Preamble 
2 Young men in the United States are required only to register for mili-
tary service when most of the other major countries of the world require 
this service. In NATO, for example, the following countries have compul-
sory military service: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and West Germany. Switzerland 
also has compulsory service as do-of course--all the communist countries. 
See, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Bal-
ance 1983-1984 (1983)." 
3 The Federalist Papers, the essays arguing in favor of adoption of the 
Constitution, are replete with emphasis on the need for a national govern-
ment to provide for defense by raising and maintaining armed forces. In 
John Jay's prescient Paper, No. 4, he observed that the "safety of the peo-
ple of American against dangers from foreign forces depends not only on 
[our] forebearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on 
their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite 
hostility. . . It is too true, however, disgraceful it may be to human na-
ture, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect 
of getting anything by it; [and] absolute monarchs will often make war 
83-276-CONCUR 
SELECTIVE SERVICE v. MINN. PUBL. INT. RES. GP. 3 
of the Constitution declares that one of the Framers' pur-
poses was to "provide for the common defence." 4 
As I find that § 1113 is punitive neither in its purpose or 
effect, it is unnecessary in my view to reach the other argu-
ments addressed by the Court on the Bill of Attainder issue. 5 
I add, however, that I do not disagree with the Court's rea-
soning, except to the extent it relies upon the Secretary's 
regulation that "interprets" the 1983 Act. In view of the 
compelling interest of government, the constitutionality of 
§ 1113 does not depend upon this interpretation. 
In sum, I join sections I, II B, III and IV of the Court's 
opinion, and its judgment. 
when their nations are to get nothing by it. ... " The Federalist No. 4, at 
pp. 18-19 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). 
Many of the opponents of the national union argued against "the raising 
of armies in time of peace." Responding to this argument, Alexander 
Hamilton answered that the "United States would then exhibit the most 
extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen-that of a nation in-
capacitated by its constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually 
invaded." The Federalist No. 25, p. 161 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton 
also spoke of the danger of "expos[ing] our property and liberty to the 
mercy of foreign invaders and invit[ing] them by our weakness [to attack 
our country]." Ibid; see also The Federalist No. 24 (A. Hamilton). 
• Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress, in a sin-
gle clause, ''to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defense and 
General Welfare of the United States." 
5 In support of their contention that § 1113 is a form of punishment, ap-
pellees cite Ex Parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867), Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), and United States v. Lovett, 328 
U. S. 303 (1946). In each of these cases, the Court held that" 'a legislative 
decree of perpetual exclusion' from a chosen vocation" was ''punishment" 
for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id., at 316. Those cases are 
inapposite here. Section 1113 does not restrict in any way appellees' 
choice of vocations or otherwise restrict the exercise of any constitutional 
right. It merely provides that those men who wish to receive title IV aid 
must first comply with the registration laws. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I do not disagree with the holding or, indeed, with most of l 
the Court's opinion. As I view this case, however, the Bill of 
Attainder issue can and should be disposed of solely on the 
ground that § 1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1983 
is not punitive legislation. 
Unless § 1113 is punitive in its purpose and effect, there is 
no Bill of Attainder. Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services, 433 U. S. 425, 472 (1977). The term "punitive" 
connotes punishment as for a crime. Young men who know-
ingly have failed to comply with the registration require-
ments of the Selective Service Act have committed a crime 
for which the Act itself provides the only punishment. 1 Sec-
tion 1113 is in no sense punitive; it authorizes no punishment 
1 Section 12 of the Military Selective Service Act provides, in relevant 
part: 
"[A]ny person who . . . evades or refuses registration or service in the 
armed forces or any of the requirements of this title . . . or who in any 
manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any duty re-
quired of him under or in the execution of this title, . . . or rules, regula-
tions, or directions made pursuant to this title . . . shall, upon conviction in 
any district court of the United States of competent jurisdicton, be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more 
than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment .. .. " 50 U. S. C. 
App. §462. 
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in any normal or general acceptance of that familiar term. 
Rather, it provides a benefit at the expense of taxpayers gen-
erally for those who request and qualify for it. There is no 
compulsion to request the benefit. No minority or disfa-
vored group is singled out by Congress for disparate 
treatment. 
Section 1113 applies broadly and equally to every male citi-
zen and resident alien who upon attaining 18 years of age is 
required by Presidential order to register with the Selective 
Service. 2 AB its legislative history makes clear, § 1113 was 
enacted to encourage compliance with the Selective Service 
Act, leaving punishment for failure to comply entirely to the 
provisions of the Act itself and to the normal enforcement 
provisions provided by law. The Court observes that Con-
gress by§ 1113 has adopted a "rational means" to encourage 
compliance with law. Ante, at 12. It is encouragement 
only; not compulsion. Moreover, the interest of govern-
ment-indeed of the people of our country-in providing for 
national security is compelling. It has been recognized as 
such from the earliest days of the Republic. 3 The Preamble 
2 Young men in the United States are required only to register for mili-
tary service when most of the other major countries of the world require 
this service. In NATO, for example, the following countries have compul-
sory military service: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and West Germany. Switzerland 
also has compulsory service as do---0f course-all the communist countries. 
See, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Bal-
ance 1983-1984 (1983)." 
3 The Federalist Papers, the essays arguing in favor of adoption of the 
Constitution, are replete with emphasis on the need for a national govern-
ment to provide for defense by raising and maintaining armed forces. In 
John Jay's prescient Paper, No. 4, he observed that the "safety of the peo-
ple of American against dangers from foreign forces depends not only on 
[our] forebearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on 
their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invi,te 
hostility. . . It is too true , however, disgraceful it may be to human na-
ture, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect 
of getting anything by it; [and] absolute monarchs will often make war 
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of the Constitution declares that one of the Framers' pur-
poses was to "provide for the common defence." 4 
As I find that § 1113 is punitive neither in its purpose or 
effect, it is unnecessary in my view to reach the other argu-
ments addressed by the Court on the Bill of Attainder issue. 5 
I add, however, that I do not disagree with the Court's rea-
soning, except to the extent it relies upon the Secretary's 
regulation that "interprets" the 1983 Act. In view of the 
compelling interest of government, the constitutionality of 
§ 1113 does not depend upon this interpretation. 
In sum, I join sections I, II B, III and IV of the Court's 
opinion, and its judgment. 
when their nations are to get nothing by it .... " The Federalist No. 4, at 
pp. 18-19 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). 
Many of the opponents of the national union argued against "the raising 
of armies in time of peace." Responding to this argument, Alexander 
Hamilton answered that the "United States would then exhibit the most 
extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen-that of a nation in-
capacitated by its constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually 
invaded." The Federalist No. 25, p. 161 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton 
also spoke of the danger of "expos[ing] our property and liberty to the 
mercy of foreign invaders and invit[ing] them by our weakness [to attack 
our country]." Ibid; see also The Federalist No. 24 (A. Hamilton). 
• Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress, in a sin-
gle clause, ''to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defense and 
General Welfare of the United States." 
• In support of their contention that § 1113 is a form of punishment, ap-
pellees cite Ex Parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867), Cummings v. 
Missauri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), and United States v. Lovett, 328 
U. S. 303 (1946). In each of these cases, the Court held that "'a legislative 
decree of perpetual exclusion' from a chosen vocation" was ''punishment" 
for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id., at 316. Those cases are 
inapposite here. Section 1113 does not restrict in any way appellees' 
choice of vocations or otherwise restrict the exercise of any constitutional 
right. It merely provides that those men who wish to receive title IV aid 
must first comply with the registration laws. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurrini1j, ~ ~ .:':i ~: .. ;;}: 
I do not disagree with the holliing or, indeed, with most of ~ · n\V"Y'" '\ -
the Court's opinion. As I view this case, however, the Bill of 
Attainder issue can and should be disposed of solely on the 
ground that § 1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1983 
is not punitive legislation. 
Unless § 1113 is punitive in its purpose and effect, there is 
no Bill of Attainder. Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services, 433 U. S. 425, 472 (1977). The term "punitive" 
connotes punishment as for a crime. Young men who know-
ingly have failed to comply with the registration require-
ments of the Selective Service Act have committed a crime 
for which the Act itself provides the only punishment. 1 Sec-
tion 1113 is in no sense punitive; it authorizes no punishment 
1 Section 12 of the Military Selective Service Act provides, in relevant 
part: 
"[A]ny person who . . . evades or refuses registration or service in the 
armed forces or any of the requirements of this title . . . or who in any 
manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any duty re-
quired of him under or in the execution of this title, ... or rules, regula-
tions, or directions made pursuant to this title . . . shall, upon conviction in 
any district court of the United States of competent jurisdicton, be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more 
than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment . .. . " 50 U. S. C. 
App. §462. 
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in any normal or general acceptance of that familiar term. 
Rather, it provides a benefit at the expense of taxpayers gen-
erally for those who request and qualify for it. There is no 
compulsion to request the benefit. No minority or disfa-
vored group is singled out by Congress for disparate 
treatment. 
Section 1113 applies broadly and equally to every male citi-
zen and resident alien who upon attaining 18 years of age is 
required by Presidential order to register with the Selective 
Service. 2 As its legislative history makes clear, § 1113 was 
enacted to encourage compliance with the Selective Service 
Act, leaving punishment for failure to comply entirely to the 
provisions of the Act itself and to the normal enforcement 
provisions provided by law. The Court observes that Con-
gress by § 1113 has adopted a "rational means" to encourage 
compliance with law. Ante, at 12. It is encouragement 
only; not compulsion. Moreover, the interest of govern-
ment-indeed of the people of our country-in providing for 
national security is compelling. It has been recognized as 
such from the earliest days of the Republic. 3 The Preamble 
2 Young men in the United States are required only to register for mili-
tary service when most of the other major countries of the world require 
this service. In NATO, for example, the following countries have compul-
sory military service: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and West Germany. Switzerland 
also has compulsory service as do-of course-all the communist countries. 
See, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Bal-
ance 1983-1984 (1983)." 
3 The Federalist Papers, the essays arguing in favor of adoption of the 
Constitution, are replete with emphasis on the need for a national govern-
ment to provide for defense by raising and maintaining armed forces . In 
John Jay's prescient Paper, No. 4, he observed that the "safety of the peo-
ple of America against dangers from foreign forces depends not only on 
[our] forbearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on 
their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite 
hostility. . . It is too true, however, disgraceful it may be to human na-
ture, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect 
of getting anything by it; [and] absolute monarchs will often make war 
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of the Constitution declares that one of the Framers' pur-
poses was to "provide for the common defence." 4 
As I find that § 1113 is punitive neither in its purpose or 
effect, it is unnecessary in my view to reach the other argu-
ments addressed by the Court on the Bill of Attainder issue. 5 
I add, however, that I do not disagree with the Court's rea-
soning, except to the extent it relies upon the Secretary's 
regulation that "interprets" the 1983 Act. In view of the 
compelling interest of government, the constitutionality of 
§ 1113 does not depend upon this interpretation. 
In sum, I join sections I, II B, III and IV of the Court's 
opinion, and its judgment. 
when their nations are to get nothing by it .... " The Federalist No. 4, at 
pp. 18-19 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). 
Many of the opponents of the national union argued against "the raising 
of armies in time of peace." Responding to this argument, Alexander 
Hamilton answered that the "United States would then exhibit the most 
extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen-that of a nation in-
capacitated by its constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually 
invaded." The Federalist No. 25, p. 161 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton 
also spoke of the danger of "expos[ing] our property and liberty to the 
mercy of foreign invaders and invit[ing] them by our weakness [to attack 
our country]." Ibid; see also The Federalist No. 24 (A. Hamilton). 
'Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress, in a sin-
gle clause, "to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defense and 
General Welfare of the United States." 
5 In support of their contention that § 1113 is a form of punishment, ap-
pellees cite Ex Parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867), Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), and United States v. Lovett, 328 
U. S. 303 (1946). In each of these cases, the Court held that" 'a legislative 
decree of perpetual exclusion' from a chosen vocation" was "punishment" 
for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id., at 316. Those cases are 
inapposite here. Section 1113 does not restrict in any way appellees' 
choice of vocations or otherwise restrict the exercise of any constitutional 
right. It merely provides that those men who wish to receive title IV aid 
must first comply with the registration laws. 
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[July 5, 1984] 
I JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the ( judgment. I do not disagree with the holding or, indeed, with most of 
the Court's opinion. As I view this case, however, the Bill of 
Attainder issue can and should be disposed of solely on the 
ground that § 1113 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1983 
is not punitive legislation. 
Unless § 1113 is punitive in its purpose and effect, there is 
no Bill of Attainder. Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services, 433 U. S. 425, 472 (1977). The term "punitive" 
connotes punishment as for a crime. Young men who know-
ingly have failed to c'omply with the registration require-
ments of the Selective Service Act have committed a crime 
for which the Act itself provides the only punishment. 1 Sec-
tion 1113 is in no sense punitive; it authorizes no punishment 
1 Section 12 of the Military Selective Service Act provides, in relevant 
part: 
"[A]ny person who . . . evades or refuses registration or service in the 
armed forces or any of the requirements of this title . . . or who in any 
manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any duty re-
quired of him under or in the execution of this title, ... or rules , regula-
tions, or directions made pursuant to this title .. . shall, upon conviction in 
any district court of the United States of competent jurisdicton, be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more 
than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment .... " 50 U. S. C. 
App. §462. 
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in any normal or general acceptance of that familiar term. 
Rather, it provides a benefit at the expense of taxpayers 
generally for those who request and qualify for it. There 
is no compulsion to request the benefit. No minority or 
disfavored group is singled out by Congress for disparate 
treatment. 
Section 1113 applies broadly and equally to every male citi-
zen and resident alien who upon attaining 18 years of age is 
required by Presidential order to register with the Selective 
Service. 2 As its legislative history makes clear, § 1113 was 
enacted to encourage compliance with the Selective Service 
Act, leaving punishment for failure to comply entirely to the 
provisions of the Act itself and to the normal enforcement 
provisions provided by law. The Court observes that Con-
gress by § 1113 has adopted a "rational means" to encourage 
compliance with law. Ante, at 12. It is encouragement 
only; not compulsion. Moreover, the interest of govern-
ment-indeed of the people of our country-in providing for 
national security is compelling. It has been recognized as 
such from the earliest days of the Republic. 3 The Preamble 
2 Young men in the United States are required only to register for mili-
tary service when most of the other major countries of the world require 
this service. In NATO, for example, the following countries have compul-
sory military service: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and West Germany. Switzerland 
also has compulsory service as do-of course-all the communist countries. · 
See, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Bal-
ance 1983-1984 (1983)." 
3 The Federalist Papers, the essays arguing in favor of adoption of the 
Constitution, are replete with emphasis on the need for a national govern-
ment to provide for defense by raising and maintaining armed forces. In 
John Jay's prescient Paper, No. 4, he observed that the "safety of the peo-
ple of America against dangers from foreign forces depends not only on 
[our] forbearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on 
their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite 
hostility. . . It is too true, however, disgraceful it may be to human na-
ture, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect 
of getting anything by it; [and] absolute monarchs will often make war 
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of the Constitution declares that one of the Framers' pur-
poses was to "provide for the common defence." 4 
As I find that § 1113 is punitive neither in its purpose or 
effect, it is unnecessary in my view to reach the other argu-
ments addressed by the Court on the Bill of Attainder issue. 5 
I add, however, that I do not disagree with the Court's rea-
soning, except to the extent it relies upon the Secretary's 
regulation that "interprets" the 1983 Act. In view of the 
compelling interest of government, the constitutionality of 
§ 1113 does not depend upon this interpretation. 
In sum, I join sections I, II B, III and IV of the Court's 
opinion, and its judgment. 
when their nations are to get nothing by it .... " The Federalist No. 4, at 
pp. 18-19 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). 
Many of the opponents of the national union argued against "the raising 
of armies in time of peace." Responding to this argument, Alexander 
Hamilton answered that the "United States would then exhibit the most 
extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen-that of a nation in-
capacitated by its constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually 
invaded." The Federalist No. 25, p.161 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton 
also spoke of the danger of "expos[ing] our property and liberty to the 
mercy of foreign invaders and invit[ing] them by our weakness [to attack 
our country]." Ibid; see also The Federalist No. 24 (A. Hamilton). 
' Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress, in a sin-
gle clause, "to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defense and 
General Welfare of the United States. " 
5 In support of their contention that § 1113 is a form of punishment, ap~- _ 
pellees cite Ex Parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall. ) 333 (1867), Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall. ) 277 (1867), and United States v. Lovett, 328 
U. S. 303 (1946). In each of these cases, the Court held that" 'a legislative 
decree of perpetual exclusion' from a chosen vocation" was "punishment" 
for purposes of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id. , at 316. Those cases are 
inapposite here. Section 1113 does not restrict in any way appellees' 
choice of vocations or otherwise restrict the exercise of any constitutional 
right. It merely provides that those men who wish to receive title IV aid 
must first comply with the registration laws. 
